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THE DIRKSEN AMENDMENT AND THE
ARTICLE V CONVENTION PROCESS
Arthur Earl Bonfield*
THE PROBLEM

March 18, 1967, the New York Times announced that "[a]
campaign for a constitutional convention to modify the Supreme Court's "one man-one vote" rule is nearing success. It would
be the first such Convention since the Constitution was drafted in
Philadelphia in 1787."1 The newspaper report went on to note that
as of that date, thirty-two states had formally requested Congress to
convene a federal constitutional convention for the purpose of proposing amendments to our fundamental law on the subject of state
legislative apportionment. Since article V of the United States
Constitution provides that "on the Application of the Legislatures
of two-thirds of the several states [Congress] shall call a Convention
for proposing amendments," the article concluded that the proponents of the convention "lack only two states in their drive" to
assemble such a body.
The target of this convention drive is the decision of the United
States Supreme Court in Reynolds v. Sims2 which held "that, as a
basic constitutional standard, the Equal Protection Clause requires
that the seats in both houses of a bicameral state legislature must be
apportioned on a population basis."3 Forces led by Senator Everett
Dirksen hope to amend the Constitution so that the several states can
apportion one house of their bicameral legislatures on some basis
other than population. After an attempt to induce Congress to propose such an amendment failed for want of the requisite two-thirds
vote, Senator Dirksen, bolstered by earlier similar efforts of the
Council of State Governments, 4 concentrated his efforts on the convention approach to proposing constitutional amendments. 5 As the
New York Times story of March 18 stated, "[m]ost of official Wash-
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1. Graham, Efforts To .&mend The Constitution On Districts Gain, N.Y. Times,
March 18, 1967, at 1, col. 6.
2. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
3. Id. at 568.
4. Amending the Constitution To Strengthen the States in the Federal System, 36
STATE Gov'T 10 (1963). See Oberst, The Genesis of the Three States-Rights Amendments of 196J, 39 NOTRE DAME LAw. 644 (1964).
5. Graham, supra note 1.
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ington [was] caught by surprise because the state legislative actions
[in attempting to summon a convention for this purpose] have been
taken with little fanfare."
Within a week of this revelation congressional forces favoring
the reapportionment decisions reacted, especially "to Senator . . .
Dirksen's assertion ... that two more legislatures would soon pass
similar [convention call] resolutions, thus confronting Congress with
the required 34." 6 Senator Joseph Tydings, in a speech to the United
States Senate, suggested that the effort to convene a constitutional
convention as a means of proposing the Dirksen legislative apportionment amendment should not succeed.7 He asserted that even if
two more states joined the thirty-two that had recently requested
such a convention, Congress could not properly call one, because
the tendered applications of those states were improper. Senator
Dirksen disagrees. 8 Since no additional state legislatures have tendered resolutions requesting such a convention, Congress has not
yet been forced to resolve the many legal issues involved. It may,
however, have to do so in the near future. With this in mind, Senator
Sam Ervin recently introduced a bill into the Congress which would
"provide procedures for calling constitutional conventions for proposing amendments to the Constitution of the United States." 0
This article will concentrate on the legal issues facing Congress
in the current effort to call a constitutional convention. Because all
of the previous amendments to the Constitution were proposed to
the states by a two-thirds vote of both Houses of Congress, the issues
raised in the present situation have never been resolved. The appropriate course of action for the national legislature is especially in
doubt. An attempt will therefore be made here to focus on proper
decision-making by Congress in resolving these constitutional issues.
The role of the judiciary will be considered only incidentally, since,
as will be seen, the primary obligation to decide questions raised in
the amending process rests with Congress. It is also possible that the
final dispositive power on this subject rests effectively in Congress
because the courts may consider all or most of the issues raised in
the amending process nonjusticiable political questions.10 Neverthe6. Graham, Amendment Drive Meets Challenge, N.Y. Times, March 23, 1967, at
19, col. 4.
7. 113 CoNG, R.Ec. S.4231-43 (daily ed. March 22, 1967).
8. 113 CONG. REc. S.5460-65 (daily ed. April 19, 1967).
9. S. 2307 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967). Hearings were subsequently held on this bill.
10. See Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 457 (1939) (concurring opinion); Dowling,
Clarijying the Amending Process, I WASH. &: LEE L. R.Ev. 215 (1940). On the justiciability 9J q_uestions arising in the amending process, see generally C. BIUCKFlELD, STAFF
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less, "in the exercise of that power, Congress . . . is [still] governed
by the Constitution.'' 11 The following discussion of constitutional
principles should, therefore, be considered as an appropriate guide
for consideration by Congress when that body undertakes to perform its obligations respecting an article V convention.12

I.

THE APPLICATIONS BY THE STATES

A. Article V Applications as Prerequisites for a Convention Call

Congress is neither authorized nor compelled to summon an
article V convention prior to the submission by two-thirds of the
state legislatures of proper and timely applications for such a convention. The reasons for this are several. Since the United States is a
government of delegated powers, it possesses no authority except that
conferred upon it by the Constitution. Article V, the only provision
in the Constitution dealing with its amendment, must therefore be
deemed exhaustive and not merely illustrative of the federal government's powers in this regard. That provision explicitly sets out
two modes for proposing constitutional amendments, only one of
which contemplates the convening of a convention empowered to
propose amendments. Such a "Convention" is authorized by article
V only when two-thirds of the state legislatures have made "Applications" for a convention. As a result, applications within the meaning
of article V from two-thirds of the state legislatures must fairly be
deemed absolute prerequisites to the summoning of such a body.13
OF HOUSE COMM. ON nu: JUDICIARY, 85TII CONG., lsr SESS., PROBLEMS RELATING TO A
FEDERAL CoNsrlTUTIONAL CONVENTION 27-28, 40-43 (Comm. Print 1957); L. ORFIELD,
AMENDING nu: FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 7-36 (1942); Clark, The Supreme Court and the
Amending Process, 39 VA. L. REv. 621 (1953); Scharpf, Judicial Review and the Political Question: A Functional Analysis, 75 YALE L.J. 517, 587-89 (1966); Note, Proposing Amendments to the United States Constitution by Convention, 70 HARv. L. REv.
1067 (1957).
11. Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 457 (1939).
12. U.S. CoNsr. art. V provides:
The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall
propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for proposing
Amendments, which, in either Case, shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as
Part of this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the
several States, or by Conventions in three fourths thereof, as the one or the other
Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the Congress.
13. See ORFIELD, supra note 10, at 40; Black, The Proposed Amendment of Article
V: A Threatened Disaster, 72 YALE L.J. 957, 962-64 (1963); Corwin &: Ramsey, The
Constitutional Law of Constitutional Amendment, 26 NOTRE DAME LAW. 185, 196
(1951). An analogy is to be found in those state constitutions which require a specific
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If these applications were not prerequisites, a majority of Congress,
on its mm say-so, could validly summon such a body and determine its make-up and mode of operation.14 Thus, it could provide that the convention be able to propose amendments to the
states by a mere majority of its delegates. But article V insists that a
two-thirds vote be required by both houses of Congress, or that twothirds of the state legislatures make application for a convention,
before an amendment to the Constitution may be proposed to the
states. This reflects the conviction of the Founding Fathers that the
seriousness of this kind of action demands a national consensus.
Permitting a simple majority of Congress to call a convention empowered to propose constitutional amendments approved by a
simple majority of delegates would, therefore, frustrate the wellreasoned intentions of the Constitution's drafters: the particularly
high degree of consensus contemplated would no longer be required
at any point to trigger the amending process.
Another reason supports the view that valid article V applications are an absolute precondition to a convention call: "[A] high
degree of adherence to exact form . . . is desirable in this ultimate
legitimating process." 15 Because of the uniquely fundamental nature
of a constitutional amendment, attempts to alter our Constitution
should not be filled with questionable procedures which could
reasonably cast doubt on the ultimate validity of the provision produced. The procedure followed in any effort to amend the Constitution should be so perfect that it renders unequivocal to all reasonable men the binding nature of the product. Consequently, there
must be a firm and unyielding adherence to the precise procedures
of article V. This unusual need for certainty in amending our fundamental law also lends additional force to the assumption that the
precise procedures provided in article V must be deemed exclusive.
B. Sufficiency of the State Resolutions: Their Form

The current applications for a convention must, therefore, be
carefully scrutinized in order to determine their adequacy for purmandate at the polls before the legislature can call a state constitutional convention.
See IowA CoNST. art. X, § 3; NEv. CONST. art. XVI, § 2; N.Y. CONST. art. XIX, § I;
S.D. CONST. art. XXIII, § 2: TENN. CONST. art. XI, § 3.
14. The terms of article V in no way suggest that Congress may not convene such
a body by the usual vote required for congressional action. Consequently, no more
than a majority vote would seem to be required to "call a Convention" or to establish
its procedures. See Forkosch, The Alternative A.mending Clause in Article V: Reflections and Suggestions, 51 MINN. L. REv. 1053, 1067 (1967).
15. Black, supra note 13, at 963.
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poses of article V. I£ the state legislative resolutions are not applications for a convention within the meaning of article V, Congress
would neither be authorized nor obligated to call a convention pursuant thereto.
Twenty-nine of the thirty-two resolutions requesting a federal
constitutional convention are identical, or nearly so, as to the nature
of the convention they seek from Congress. Their language follows
the model application sponsored by the Council of State Governments and in almost every case provides "that this Legislature
respectfully petitions the Congress of the United States to call a
convention for the purpose of proposing the following article [set
out below] as an amendment to the Constitution of the United
States."16 The three other states adopted resolutions which apply
for a convention in order to propose to the states an amendment, the
text of which is not stipulated, that would obtain a specified result.17
In the initial version of his bill, Senator Ervin seemed to believe that
both of these kinds of applications are proper for article V purposes.
Thus, he took the view that the states may petition for a convention
solely to propose or refrain from proposing specific preselected
amendments to the Constitution. The original bill provided that a
state application would be sufficient if it petitioned "the Congress
stating, in substance, that the legislature requests the calling of a
convention for the purpose of proposing one or more amendments
[of a particular nature] to the Constitution of the United States and
stating the [specific] nature of the amendment or amendments to be
proposed."18 The bill now proposed by Senator Ervin deletes the
bracketed language. It may be hoped that these deletions indicate an
awareness that, as will hereafter be demonstrated, the current applications do not qualify under article V.
The amending article of the Constitution clearly specifies that
Congress "shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments." The
process of proposing amendments would seem to contemplate a conscious weighing and evaluation of various alternative solutions to the
16. Amending the Constitution To Strengthen the States in the Federal System,
supra note 4, at 11-14. See also 113 CONG. REc. S.4232-33 (daily ed. March 22, 1967);
AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE, SPECIAL ANALYSIS, A CONVENTION To AMEND THE CON·
STITUTION? 11-16 (1967); E. YADLOSKY, STATE PETITIONS AND MEMORIALS TO CONGRESS ON
THE SUBJECT OF STATE LEGISLATURES, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE SER•
VICE REPORT JK140C32/205R (to Aug. 5, 1965).
17. AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE, supra note 16, at 12, 16.
18. S. 2307, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1967) (original bill); for the amended version
of S. 2307, see appx. to Senator Ervin's article in this symposium, 66 MICH. L. REv.
896 (1968) [hereinafter cited as amended bill, Ervin appx.].
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problems perceived. In this connection the following should be
noted:
The process of "proposal" by Congress, contained in the first alternative of Article V, obviously [and necessarily] includes the process of
plenary deliberation upon the whole problem to which the amendment is to address itself. It entails choice among the whole range
of alternatives as to substance and wording. It is "proposal" in the
most fully substantial sense, where the proposer controls and works
out the content and form of the proposition. It is very doubtful
whether the same word two lines later, in the description of the
second alternative, ought to be taken to denote a mechanical takeit-or-leave-it process. 19

There is a sound basis for the suggestion that article V contemplates a deliberative convention that would itself undertake to evaluate fully a problem and propose those particular solutions that it
deems desirable. Amendments to our national Constitution are
chiefly matters of national concern. Consequently, all the alternatives
should be carefully explored and debated on a national level, and
the details of any proposed amendments fully worked out on a
national level, before they are sent to the states for the more locally
oriented ratification procedure. It can reasonably be assumed that
the two modes provided for "proposing" amendments found in
article V were to be symmetrical in this regard. Whether "proposed"
by Congress or a convention, the subject matter of any suggested
amendment should be "considered as a problem, with [an evaluation of] a wide range of possible solutions and an opportunity to
raise and discuss them all in a body with national responsibility and
adequately flexible power."20 The "Convention" contemplated by
article V was, therefore, to be a fully deliberative body-with power
to propose to the states as amendments any solutions to the problem
submitted to it that it deemed best.
If this be so, the resolutions under consideration should be
deemed insufficient applications within the meaning of article V and
should not empower Congress to call a convention. Instead of requesting such a deliberative convention, these resolutions demand
"a convention for the purpose of proposing the following article
as an amendment to the Constitution of the United States."21 This
19. Black, supra note 13, at 962 (emphasis in original).
20. Id. at 963. Brickfield disagrees. He notes that "State legislatures can limit a
convention to the consideration of specific amendments." BRICKFIELD, supra note IO,
at 25 (emphasis added).
21. See text accompanying note 16 supra.
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is, in effect, a call for a convention empowered solely to approve or
disapprove in a mechanical way the text of specific amendments that
have already been "proposed"-that is, deliberated-elsewhere. In
a sense, th1s would seek to make the convention part of the ratifying
process, rather than part of the deliberative process for proposing
constitutional amendments. 22 These resolutions, then, are materially
defective for purposes of article V because of their failure to request
an article V convention.23 Lest this construction of article V be
deemed too confining, it should be pointed out that were the states
to demand the kind of fully deliberative convention contemplated by
the Constitution, this would not preclude their submission of
specific proposals to that body for its consideration.
Furthermore, Congress has no authority to treat these resolutions
as applications for the kind of convention article V does contemplate. It cannot be realistically inferred from these resolutions that
the state legislatures tendering them would be satisfied or willing to
have a plenary convention consider the problems at which these
amendments were directed and submit to the states the solutions to
those problems that the convention deemed best. Would they be
willing to have a plenary and unfettered convention consider how
much authority state legislatures should have over their apportionment? Even if such a convention might propose that the "one manone vote" principle be stringently applied and expressly written into
the federal Constitution? "It is not for Congress to guess whether a
state which asks for one kind of 'convention' wants the other as a
second choice. Altogether different political considerations might
govern. " 24
Senator Dirksen, however, notes that the Constitution is silent as
to the form of the application for a convention. "Since State legislatures must initiate [applications], under article V ... [their form]
is a matter for them to determine. All that is needed, by a rule of
reason, is a clear expression of intent by the legislatures. So what
difference does it make in what form the application for a convention is made?" 25 The distinguished Senator is undoubtedly correct.
However, the propriety of his conclusion that the current applica22. Shanahan, Proposed Constitutional Amendments: They Will Strengthen Federal-State Relations, 49 A.B.A.J. 631, 633 (1963). He specifically notes that the purpose
of including the actual text amendments was to insure that the "applicants" for a
convention retained control over the amendments ultimately proposed.
23. See 113 CONG. REc. S.5455 (daily ed. April 19, 1967) (remarks of Senator R. Kennedy to the same effect).
24. Black, supra note 13, at 964.
25. 113 CONG. REc. S.5463 (daily ed. April 19, 1967) (remarks of Senator Dirksen).
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tions are therefore legally sufficient to trigger the convention process
is dependent upon the nature of the legislative intent we are looking
for. The present resolutions are inadequate precisely because the
clear intent of the state legislatures in requesting a nondeliberative
convention is the wrong intent for article V purposes. Surely Senator
Dirksen is not suggesting that, in the face of the clear and unambiguous language of the resolutions demanding a convention simply
to approve or disapprove a preselected specific amendment, Congress
could properly find a request for a fully deliberative convention
which would consider the general problem as a whole and propose
its own independent solution to the states.26 If he is, the Senator
seems to be ignoring the long tradition of honoring, in the absence
of linguistic ambiguities, the plain meaning of a statute's language.27
Even the legislative history-usually resorted to only as a means of
resolving ambiguities on the face of a statute and not to impeach
those things clearly settled by its language28-is directly in opposition
to any assumption that the creators of these state resolutions were
requesting a deliberative convention of the type contemplated by
article V. 29
Most of the state resolutions contain another defect which may
preclude their characterization as valid article V applications. Those
which follow the format sponsored by the Council of State Governments specify that the amendment is to be ratified by the state
legislatures.30 But article V clearly indicates that regardless of the
mode of an amendment's proposal, Congress is to decide whether it
shall be ratified by three-fourths of the state legislatures or threefourths of the special ratifying conventions held in each state.31
Arguably, then, these resolutions may also be insufficient as article V
applications because they achieve an illegitimate end: they seek to
prevent Congress from exercising its constitutionally-based discre26. It has been suggested that a state application for a convention requesting a
specific amendment can be counted as a valid application, although the petition's re•
quest for a specific amendment would have no binding effect on the convention. Sec
Wheeler, Is a Constitutional Convention Impending?, 21 !LL. L. R.Ev. 782, 795 (1927).
See also .AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE, supra note 16, at 22.
27. See, e.g., Thompson v. Siratt, 95 F.2d 214 (8th Cir. 1938); Equitable Life Assurance Sec'y v. Bowers, 87 F.2d 687 (2d Cir. 1937); Hutton v. Phillips, 70 A.2d 15 (Del.
Super. 1949); 2 J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 316, 334-36 (3d ed. 1943).
28. See authorities cited in note 27 supra.
29. See Oberst, supra note 4; Shanahan, supra note 22.
30. Amending the Constitution To Strengthen the States in the Federal System,
supra note 4, at 11-14; Yadlosky, supra note 16.
31. United States v. Sprague, 282 U.S. 716 (1931).
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tion to choose the mode of ratification of proposed constitutional
amendments.

C. The Role of State Governors in the Application Process
The Council of State Governments specified that the application
it sponsored "should be in whatever technical form the state employs
for a single resolution of both houses of the legislature which does
not require the Governor to approve or veto." 32 Applications sponsored by Senator Dirksen have taken the same approach. The propriety of this view depends upon whether the term "legislature" in
the application provision of article V means the whole legislative
process of the state-as defined in the state constitution-or only
its representative lawmaking body.
Hawke v. Smith, No. 1 33 interpreted "legislatures" in the ratification clause of article V to mean the representative lawmaking body
only, since "ratification by a State of a constitutional amendment is
not an act of legislation within the proper sense of the word." 34 If
the term "legislature" is so interpreted in the ratification clause of
article V, no valid reason appears why it should not bear the same
meaning in the application clauses of that provision.
Additional support for the view that the governor of a state need
not sign its application for an article V convention can be gleaned
from the case of Hollingsworth v. Virginia. 35 It was argued in that
case that the eleventh amendment was invalid because, after it had
been approved for proposal to the states by a two-thirds vote of
Congress, it had not been tendered to the President for his signature
and thus was never properly submitted to the states for their ratification. Justice Chase answered that "the negative of the President
applies only to the ordinary cases of legislation; he has nothing to
do with the proposition or adoption of amendments to the Constitu32. Amending the Constitution To Strengthen the States in the Federal System,
supra note 4, at 11.
33. 253 U.S. 221 (1920). That case held that a state could not restrict the ratifying
power of its legislature by providing for a binding popular referendum on the question.
34. Id. at 229. As a result, the Court held that a state constitutional provision that
provided for a referendum on the action of the General Assembly in ratifying any
proposed amendment to the United States Constitution was in conflict with article V.
Contra, State ex rel. Mullen v. Howell, 107 Wash. 167, 181 P. 920 (1919). An approach
similar to that of Hawke v. Smith, No. 1 has been taken by state courts with regard
to state constitutional amendments. See Mitchell v. Hopper, 153 Ark. 515, 241 S.W. 10
(1922); Larkin v. Gronna, 69 N.D. 234, 285 N.W. 59 (1939).
35. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 378 (1798).
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tion." 86 It is not difficult to apply this reasoning to the powers of state
governors and conclude similarly that the executive of the state has
no function to perform in the article V application process. This is
the position of the Ervin Bill.87
It can also be argued that when state legislatures petition Congress for an article V convention they act not as lawmakers under
their state constitution but rather as agents of the federal government performing a federal function. That is, they are acting as
"representatives of the people of the State under the power granted
by article V. The article therefore imports a function different
from that of lawmaker and renders inapplicable the conditions which
usually attach to the making of State laws."38 The governor's approval of an application for a convention is thus unnecessary and
his veto may be disregarded. Effective applications for an article V
convention need only be approved by a state's legislature.30 In
this respect, the underlying theory upon which the applications sponsored by Senator Dirksen and the Council of State Governments
are based is correct.
D. Timing of the Applications for a Convention
A question has been raised as to whether the thirty-two applications for a convention are "sufficiently contemporaneous to be treated
as a valid reflection of the will of the people at any one time." 40
Congress is neither empowered nor under a duty to call an article V
convention unless it receives "relatively contemporaneously," proper
applications from the required number of state legislatures. The
reason for this is that each step in the amending process is meant to
demonstrate significant agreement among the people of this country
-at one time-that changes in some particular part or the whole of
36. Id. at 381. "The most reasonable view would seem to be that the signature of
the chief executive of a State is no more essential to complete the action of the legis•
lature upon an amendment to the Federal Constitution than is that of the President
of the United States to complete the action of Congress in proposing such an amendment." H. AMES, THE PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE U.S. DURING
THE FIRST CENTURY OF !Ts HISTORY, H.R. Doc. No. 353, pt. 2, 54th Cong., 2d Sess., 298
(1897).
37. S. 2307, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(a) (1967) (amended bill); Ervin appx., 66 MICH.
L. REv. 896 (1968).
38. BRICKFIELD, supra note 10, at 10-11.
39. See STAFF OF HOUSE COM?.{. ON THE JUDICIARY, 82D CONG., 2D SESS., PRODLEl\lS
RELATING TO THE STATE APPUCATION FOR A CONVENTION To PROPOSE CONSTITUTIONAL
LIMITATIONS ON FEDERAL TAX RATES 7-8 (Comm. Print 1952); Note, supra note 10, at
1075.
40. 113 CONG, REc. S.5455 (daily ed. April 19, 1967) (remarks of Senator R. Kennedy).
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our fundamental law are desirable. Nothing less would seem acceptable in a process of such significance and lasting impact.
Analogous cases accord with this reasoning. In Dillon v. Gloss41
the Supreme Court sustained the power of Congress to fix the time
period during which ratification of a pending amendment could be
effective. Noting that article Vis silent on this question, the Court
asked: "What then is the reasonable inference or implication? Is it
that ratification may be had at any time, as within a few years, a
century or even a longer period; or that it must be had within some
reasonable period which Congress is left free to define?" 42 After
admitting that neither the debates in the Convention of 1787 nor
those in the state ratifying conventions shed any light on this question, the Court concluded that "the fair inference or implication from
Article V is that the ratification must be within some reasonable
time after proposal, which Congress is free to fix." 43 The Court's
rationale was
[A]s ratification is but the expression of the approbation of the
people and is to be effective when had in three-fourths of the States,
there is a fair implication that it must be sufficiently contemporaneous in that number of States to reflect the will of the people in all
sections at relatively the same period, which of course ratification
scattered through a long series of years would not do.44

This logic would seem equally compelling in regard to the process
of proposing amendments. Article V is silent as to how long applications for a convention are to retain their vitality. But here too it
seems that to exhibit any significant or meaningful agreement as to
the desirability of such a convention, applications from two-thirds of
the states must be "sufficiently contemporaneous ... to reflect the
will of the people in ... [different] sections at relatively the same
period." In other words, "[t]o be obligatory upon Congress, the
applications of the states should be reasonably contemporaneous
with one another, for only then would they be persuasive of a real
consensus of opinion throughout the nation for holding a convention ...." 411
While Dillon v. Gloss46 seems to establish the authority of Con41. 256 U.S. 368 (1921).
42, Id. at 371.
43. Id. at 375.
44. Id.
45. Corwin 8e Ramsey, supra note 13, at 195-96. See also .AMERICAN
STITUTE, supra note 16, at 24; BRICKFIELD, supra note 10, at 38-39.
46. 256 U.S. 368 (1921).
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gress to fix reasonable time limitations it does not solve the problem
of what should be considered sufficient contemporaneity in the
absence of such a prior stipulation. How, then, should Congress determine whether tendered applications are sufficiently contemporaneous to be counted together? When do applications become stale?
"Is the 90th Congress required to recognize resolutions set to the
89th Congress? Are state resolutions passed more than two years ago
... still valid?"47
It has been suggested that the current Congress might only consider those applications submitted during its tenure.48 That is, in
order to ascertain whether it is empowered or under an obligation
to call an article V convention, each Congress need only look to those
applications tendered during its life. The Ninetieth Congress need
not consider any applications tendered during the Eighty-ninth Congress, since the life of an application is only as long as the particular
Congress to which it is tendered. This standard of contemporaneity
seems unacceptable for a variety of reasons. In the first place, ten
applications tendered the last day of one Congress, and thirty submitted the first day of the following one would be insufficient even
though they may have been submitted only three months apart. Additionally, it should be recalled that the state legislatures do not
address their applications to any specific Congress.
Another suggestion has been that only those applications tendered
within the present generation be counted with each other; that is,
that the effective life of an application not exceed a generation.49
It may be noted that no measure of the precise length of a generation
is provided. Nor is any satisfactory rationale offered to justify Congress' counting applications together that have been tendered over
such an appreciable time period. Furthermore, convention calls made
as long ago as twenty-five or thirty years, if that be a generation,50
have no realistic relation to the present wishes of the current body
politic.
Congress might determine the effective life of an application by
engaging in an in-depth analysis of the application itself and all
47. 113 CONG, REc. S.5029 (daily ed. April 13, 1967) (remarks of Senator Javits).
48. Sprague, Shall We Have a Federal Constitutional Convention, and What Shall
It Do'!, 3 MAINE L. REv. 115, 123 (1910). The author admits that as a practical matter
such a requirement of contemporaneity would render the application process incapable
of fulfillment.
49. ORFIELD, supra note 10, at 42,
50. "Generation" is defined as "the term of years, roughly 80 among human beings,
accepted as the average period between the birth of parents and the birth of their
offspring." RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF nm ENGLISH LANGUAGE 590 (1966).
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surrounding circumstances. Precedent for this flexible approach to
timeliness exists in the ratification process. In determining what is
a reasonable time for ratification of a proposed amendment, the
courts have stressed the continuing responsiveness of the proposal to
the public will. "[A]n alteration of the Constitution proposed today
has relation to the sentiment and the felt needs of today, and . . . if
not ratified while that sentiment may fairly be supposed to exist, it
ought to be regarded as waived, and not again to be voted upon,
unless a second time proposed by Congress." 51 Consequently, an
amendment's ratification has been considered timely only when a
full analysis of the situation would show that the proposal is not
stale. For example, in Coleman v. 111.iller the Court noted:
When a proposed amendment springs from a conception of economic needs, it would be necessary ... to consider the economic conditions prevailing in the country, [and] whether these had so far
changed since the submission as to make the proposal no longer
responsive to the conception which inspired it .... [This question]
can be decided by the Congress with the full knowledge and appreciation ascribed to the national legislature of the political, social
and economic conditions which have prevailed during the period
since the submission of the amendment. 52
If this approach were to be utilized in determining the effective
life of an application, Congress would have to decide, after examination of all the facts, whether the particular application still "has relation to the sentiment and felt needs of today." 53 Among the factors
that might be considered are the political tenor of the times, then
and now; intervening or changing circumstances relevant to the
subject matter of the application since its filing; the transitory or
long-term nature of the problem to which the application for a convention addresses itself; whether the problem is still considered grave
by most Americans; and so on. The obvious difficulty with this
approach is that it requires Congress to make a determination based
on many variables that are unusually difficult, if not impossible, for
even that politically oriented body to evaluate properly and fairly.
However, it can be done.
Applying this approach to the current situation, Senators Tydings and Robert Kennedy make a very persuasive argument for
51. Dillon v. Gloss, 256 U.S. 368, 375 (1921) [quoting
585 (4th ed. 1887)].
52. Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 453-54 (1939).
53. Dillon v. Gloss, 256 U.S. 368, 375 (1921) [quoting
CONVENTIONS § 585 (4th ed. 1887)].

J. JAMESON, CONSTITUTIONAL
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presently ignoring, on grounds of staleness, most of the state applications. They suggest that:
Congress must determine when the identical acts of various States
will cease to be collectively responsive to a continuing public interest. In this particular case, over two-thirds of the [thirty-twoJenacting
legislatures were faced with reapportionment at the time they acted
and most of these legislatures have since changed in composition
and outlook. 54
[T]he reapportionment of State legislatures which had submitted
petitions to avoid such reapportionment is a political and social
condition which has "so far changed since the submission-of
the petitions-as to make the proposal no longer responsive to the
conception which inspired it." ... It is not the lapse of time, but
rather the lapse of the malapportioned legislatures themselves which
clearly indicated that the same "sentiment" in the newly apportioned
legislatures may not "fairly be supposed to exist." These petitions,
therefore, "ought to be regarded as waived, and not again to be voted
upon, unless a second time proposed" by a constitutionally apportioned State legislature.55
This analysis seems correct. The fact that a large number of the
legislatures requesting an article V convention for this purpose were
malapportioned at the time of their application and have subsequently been more equitably apportioned on the basis of population
is the very kind of consideration that is relevant to the timeliness of
such petitions according to the in-depth analysis approach. Reapportionment of these bodies on an exclusively population basis
changes their composition and outlook on the subject of reapportionment and probably precludes the assumption-absent new evidence
to the contrary-that they support the efforts of their predecessors to
permit nonpopulation-based representation. Any application for an
article V convention to propose the Dirksen amendment which was
tendered to Congress by a state legislature which has subsequently
been reapportioned on a more representative population basis should,
therefore, be rejected as stale. It cannot fairly be deemed to reflect
that state's current legislative sentiment. On this basis, fourteen to
seventeen of the thirty-two applications under examination here
should be entirely ignored. 56
54. 113 CONG. R.Ec. S.5455 (daily ed. April 19, 1967) (remarks of Senator R. Kennedy).
55. 113 CoNG. R.Ec. S.5452 (daily ed. April 19, 1967) (remarks of Senator Tydings).
56. See 113 CONG. R.Ec. S.5457-58 (daily ed. April 19, 1967) for a chart showing the
number of legislatures that have been reapportioned since the submission of their
applications for a convention. According to that chart, fourteen states had, as of that
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Senator Dirksen rejects this and insists that none of the applications in question here are stale. He notes that "[t]he point has been
made ... that these applications are invalid, because they date back,
in some instances, to 1963. I think the Supreme Court demolished
that argument pretty well in connection with the 17th Amendment."
The Senator points out that the Supreme Court held the seven-year
time period set by Congress for the seventeenth amendment's ratification reasonable and proper. "If 7 years is reasonable for ratification, is 4 years an unreasonable time in which to initiate, by State
application, a convention for the purpose of amending the same
Constitution to which they have 7 years to approve an amendment?
I submit that the rule of reason applies in every case." 57
The rule of reason may well apply but it also dictates, according
to the Goleman v. 111iller approach, a fair examination of all factors
bearing on the continuing vitality of the several applications, including the highly relevant change in circumstances noted by Senators
Tydings and Kennedy. Senator Dirksen's argument may only indicate that article V applications received within a period of seven
years could normally be considered by Congress as contemporaneous
for purposes of calling a convention. However, if there is direct and
substantial evidence, as there is here, that relevant conditions have
so changed during the seven-year period as clearly to suggest the
probability that at least some of the applications tendered four or
five years ago are stale-that is, unresponsive to the present wishes
of the people's representatives--then Congress cannot properly
count them.
It is possible to devise a simpler and perhaps more sensible approach to the question of reasonable contemporaneity and timeliness of applications than those already discussed. In counting
applications for an article V convention, Congress should properly
consider only those tendered in that period, prior to the most
recent application, during which all of the state legislatures have had
an opportunity to consider the question at a full regular session.
That is, the maximum time between those applications that can be
counted together should not exceed that period during which all
state legislatures have met once for a full regular session. In no
case could the time period involved exceed two and one-half years. 58
date, reapportioned their legislatures since filing an application for a convention on
this subject. Several additional petitioning legislatures have since been reapportioned.
57. 11!1 CoNG. REc. S.5463 (daily ed. April 19, 1967).
58. If legislature A. made such an application at the very start of its session, say in
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If this approach were used here, a large portion of the state resolutions seeking a convention to propose the Dirksen amendment would
be considered stale and no longer effective.1m
The policy advantage of this approach to timeliness of applications seems evident. The burden should always be on those who
invoke the convention process to demonstrate clearly, by sufficient
contemporaneity of their applications, that there is a present agreement among two-thirds of the states as to the desirability of a constitutional convention. This consensus can be realistically demonstrated only by limiting the count of such applications to those
made during the most recent period during which all state legislatures have had a reasonable opportunity to consider the question.
Only applications filed during this period accurately represent the
results of the most recent poll that could reasonably be taken on the
subject.
There are other advantages to this approach. Once applications
for a convention are filed, attempts to withdraw them are not likely
to be strenuously pressed. This would be true even though the legislature had changed its mind-or would no longer make such an
application as a de novo proposition. 60 The proposed approach
would force reasonably frequent reconsideration of the desirability
of such a convention in each state that had previously applied for
one. Some assurance is thereby provided that such an extraordinary
body will be convened only if applications from two-thirds of the
states clearly demonstrate by the most recent, hence most reliable
poll practicable, a present agreement on the subject.
This standard is neither unduly onerous, nor necessarily destructive of the application process. States generally will not act alone in
such matters. Indeed, the Founding Fathers probably contemplated
some concert of action in such attempts to obtain a convention. The
February 1967, it would remain valid until the end of the next full regular session
of all the state legislatures. Since many states meet only once every other year, and one
of those might make such an application at the end of its session, for example, as late as
June or July 1969, a period of two and one-half years may elapse between the first and
last applications that may be counted together.
59. Most of the states tendering applications on this subject did so in 1963 and
1965. See AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE, supra note 16, at 11-15; YADLOSKY, supra note
16. Those tendered during 1965 would have expired by this standard at the close of
the 1967 state legislatures. Those tendered in 1963, of course, would have expired
earlier. See note 58 supra.
60. But note that in a good number of cases, states have attempted to rescind ap•
plications for an article V convention that they had previously tendered. Graham, The
Role of the State in Proposing Constitutional Amendments, 49 A.B.A.J. 1181-82 (app.)
(1963).
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present effort is an excellent example. Furthermore, once a state
legislature tenders such an application it can continually renew that
application in its subsequent sessions. If there really is substantial
continuing agreement on the desirability of such a convention, debate on subsequent renewals of the state applications should be
relatively perfunctory, and the renewals easy to obtain. Constitutionally speaking, therefore, the view of timeliness urged here seems
sound and worthy of adoption by Congress.
However, despite the inferiority of such an approach, it should
be noted that Congress may well treat the problem of contemporaneity in the application process in the same way it has treated
that problem in the ratification process, since the situations are admittedly analogous. 61 In four of the last seven amendments proposed
by Congress, it specified that the states were to have up to seven years
to ratify them. 62 Our national legislature has also deemed all of the
nventy-four amendments to the Constitution properly ratified within
a time period it thought sufficiently short to demonstrate a contemporaneous agreement among the people in three-fourths of the
states, despite the fact that one took four years from the date of its
submission and another three and one-half years. 63
A test of contemporaneity as stringent as that suggested here has,
then, previously been rejected by Congress in one portion of the
amending process. However, in light of its express action in four of
the last seven amendments it submitted to the states, Congress may be
inclined to consider seven years the absolute maximum period allowable to demonstrate a "current" agreement among the people. If this
is so, proponents of the apportionment amendment will have to
secure the endorsement of proper resolutions by the legislatures of
two-thirds of the states within that period. In this connection it
should be noted that Senator Ervin's bill, which originally stated
that an application "shall remain effective for six calendar years after
the date it is received by the Congress," now has been amended to
61. It might be contended that applications for a convention need not be made
contemporaneously to be effective because the calling of a convention empowered only
to propose amendments is far less significant than ratification. But this notion should
be rejected. All parts of the amending process are too important to demand anything
less than the kind of contemporaneous agreement suggested here.
62. U.S. CONST. amends. XVIII, XX, XXI, XXII. See also Dillon v. Gloss, 256 U.S.
368 (1921).
63. THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 47-48, 54 (Corwin ed.
1952). The sixteenth amendment was proposed July 12, 1909, and ratification was completed on February 3, 1913, while the twenty-second amendment was proposed on
March 24, 1947, and ratification was completed on February 27, 1951.
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provide for a four-year application life.64 It is at least possible that,
even if Congress adopted such a specific time period as long as seven,
six, or four years, applications tendered during such a period might
be treated as merely entitled to a presumption of timeliness, absent
evidence to the contrary.

E. Right of States To Withdraw Their Applications
May a state legislature withdraw its application for a convention
if it subsequently changes its mind? It has been argued that under
article V only forward steps can be taken and that therefore a state
cannot effectively withdraw an application for a convention.06 This
view seems entirely erroneous and untenable. It would base the
presence of a sufficient number of applications solely upon a mechanical process of addition and ignore the extent to which each
application reflects the existence of the requisite contemporaneous
agreement. As one commentator noted, the requirement that applications be contemporaneous is inconsistent with the view that they
may not withdraw their applications prior to the submission of the
same by two-thirds of the states.
[I]f States were not permitted to rescind their application ... [the]
requirement [that they be contemporaneous] would not, in truth and
in fact be met, since the general sentiment for a convention could
not be said to exist in the necessary two-thirds of the States when one
or more of those States are attempting to withdraw their applications.66
Consequently, in determining whether two-thirds of the states have
applied for a convention, applications which have been rescinded
should be disregarded; 67 they no longer evidence any present intent
that a convention should be called. Senator Ervin's proposed statute
takes the same position and provides that:
A State may rescind its application calling for a constitutional convention by adopting and transmitting to the Congress a resolution
64. S. 2307, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. § 5 (1967) (amended bill); Ervin appx., 66 MICH. L,
R.Ev. 896, 897-98 (1968).
65. Note, Rescinding Memorialization Resolutions, 30 Cm.-KENT. L. R.Ev. 339 (1952).
66. C. BRICKFIELD, STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 85TH CONG., 1ST SESS.,
PROBLEMS RELATING TO A FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 46 (Comm. Print 1957).
67. See AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE, SPECIAL ANALYSIS, A CONVENTION To AMEND
THE CONSTITUTION? 32-33 (1967); Fensterwald, Constitutional Law: The States and the
Amending Process-A Reply, 46 A.B.A.J. 717, 719 (1960); Grinnel, Petitioning Congress
for a Convention: Cannot a State Change Its Mind?, 45 A.B.A.J. 1165 (1959); Note,
Proposing Amendments to the United States Constitution by Convention, 70 HAR.v. L.
R.Ev. 1067, 1071 (1957). Contra, Packard, Constitutional Law: The States and the
Amending Process, 45 A.B.A.J. 161 (1959).
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of rescission in conformity with the procedure specified ... [earlier
in this statute] except that no such rescission shall be effective as to
any valid application made for a constitutional convention upon
any subject after the date on which two-thirds or more of the State
legislatures have valid applications pending before the Congress
seeking amendments on the same subject.68
Precedents that deny states the right to rescind their ratifications
of interstate compacts69 or constitutional amendments70 are not
apposite here. Ratification is the final act by which sovereign bodies
confirm a legal or political agreement arrived at by their agents. 71
Applications for a constitutional convention, however, are merely
formal requests by state legislatures to Congress, requesting the
latter to "call a Convention for proposing Amendments" because
there is a present consensus that such action is desirable. Consequently, they do not share the dignity or finality of ratifications
which might justify the latter's irrevocable nature. 72 In this connection it should be noted that state legislatures seem to have been of
the opinion that subsequent withdrawal of their applications would
be both permissible and effective.73 The action of any state legislature in rescinding its application for a convention to propose the
Dirksen amendment should, therefore, be fully effective.

F. Counting Applications: The Requirement of Receipt
by Congress and Like Subject Matter
As noted earlier, four of the thirty-two states making application
for a constitutional convention have not formally tendered their
petitions to Congress as such. Two of these petitions appear in the
Congressional Record, inserted there by members of Congress who
presumably received them from their home state's legislature.74 The
other two are not in the Congressional Record, but at least one of
68. S. 2307, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. § 5(b) (1967) (amended bill); Ervin appx., 66 MICH.
L. REv. 896, 897-98 (1968).
69. See West Virginia ex rel. Dyer v. Sims, 341 U.S. 22 (1951).
70. There is precedent for congressional refusal to permit a state to withdraw its
ratification. Congress did so during Reconstruction when several states attempted to
withdraw their ratification of the post-Civil War amendments. The decision of Congress in that case seems clearly wrong, but its action may be attributed to the unusual
temper of the times. See Clark, The Supreme Court and the Amending Process, 39 VA.
L. REv. 621, 624-26 (1953); Grinnel, supra note 67, at ll65.
71. Fensterwald, supra note 67, at 719.
72. The common sense of article V, however, would seem to be that ratifications
can also be effectively rescinded anytime before three-fourths of the states lend their
assent to the proposed amendment. But see note 70 supra.
73. 13RICKFIELD, supra note 66, at 46, 96.
74. lll CONG. REc. 12853 (1965) (New Hampshire); Ill CONG. REc. 4320 (1965)
(Utah).
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them was transmitted to the state's congressmen.75 The question
presented is whether these applications for a convention can, irrespective of their other attributes, properly be counted in light of the
fact that they were never formally submitted to Congress.
Some persons contend that these four resolutions just described
may not be counted because "they have not been validly submitted
to Congress."
[These] resolutions were passed by legislatures which then adjourned
without taking the final step of formally sending their petitions to
Congress--a step which would appear to be required if there is to
be any orderly way of determining whether a sufficient number of
States have validly requested the calling of a convention. These
resolutions thus have the status of unfinished legislative business at
the State level. Their ability to be considered by Congress expired
when the enacting legislatures expired. Until and unless these resolutions are reenacted, they cannot serve as the basis on which this or
any future Congress can call a constitutional convention.76
While this argument has some force, it is ultimately unpersuasive.
Actual physical submission of the application to the Speaker or
Clerk of the House and the President or Secretary of the Senate is
no formal part of the state legislative process. That process ends and
is complete with the final adoption of the state resolution according
to the rules and procedures of the state legislature. 77 Consequently,
the required intent of the state legislature for purposes of article V
is fully, adequately, and formally expressed when all the legislative
requisites are fulfilled. What remains is only the actual communication to Congress of the application. The precise manner in which
that communication is accomplished does not seem to be of large
constitutional significance if there is some means of easily verifying
the existence and authenticity of such a legislative resolution. As
one commentator noted:
Advocates of the proposed convention point out that Congress has
not enacted any law for the guidance of state legislatures in communicating applications for a convention to the Congress; that the
adoption of such applications is a matter of public record, and that
the essential question is not whether copies were submitted to the
75. AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE, supra note 67, at 15-16 (Georgia and Colorado).

See id. at 16, n.l.
76. 113 CONG. REc. S.5455 (daily ed. April 19, 1967) (remarks of Senator R. Kennedy).
77. State applications must be valid legislative resolutions on this subject according to state law. See S. 2307, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3 (1967) (amended bill). See also
Forkosch, The Alternative Amending Clause in Article T': Reflections and Suggestions,
51 MINN. L. REv. 1053, 1057-58 (1967).
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proper officers of the Congress, but whether they were in fact
adopted. 78
The point is that failure to tender the form.al written applications to Congress should be considered, at most, harmless procedural
error in a situation like the present one where there is no statutorily
designated special repository for such applications. Absent a statute
on the subject, why should the means of communication reflect on
the validity of a petition? Of course, it would be tidy and probably
desirable to settle the matter by statute, as Senator Ervin's bill
does, 70 in order to avoid confusion and regularize the procedure.
But absent statutory regularization, Congress should take "official
notice" of known and verified official state actions of this sort, even
though they have not been officially received by the appropriate
congressional authorities. 8° Congress has done this in other types
of situations, 81 and should not hesitate to do so in the present case.82
In any event, even if the word "Application" in article V should
be deemed to imply a direct written communication from the state
legislature to the Congress, absent statutes to the contrary, the submission of those applications to the state's congressional delegation
should be deemed sufficient.83
Another factor to be considered in counting the state applica78. AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE, supra note 67, at 17.
79. Within thirty days after the adoption by the legislature of a State of a resolution to apply for the calling of a constitutional convention, the secretary of state
of the State, or if there be no such officer, the person who is charged by the State
law with such function, shall transmit to the Congress of the United States two
copies of the application, one addressed to the President of the Senate, and one
to the Speaker of the House of Representatives. • •• [The application must] be
accompanied by a certificate ••• certifying that the application accurately sets
forth the text of the resolution.
S. 2307, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 4(a), 4(b)(3) (1967) (amended bill) (the original bill set
a time limit of sixty days); Ervin appx., 66 MICH. L. REv. 896-97 (1968).
80. AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE, supra note 67, at 17. Contra, Forkosch, supra
note 77, at 1059-60.
81. RULES AND MANUAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, H.R. Doc. No. 459, 86th
Cong., 2d Sess. 80, § 236 (1960): "Freshman members of the U.S. House are allowed to
take their seats in cases where the credentials are delayed or lost and there is no doubt
of the election or where the governor of a state has declined to give credentials to a
person whose election was undoubted and uncontested."
82. Presumably, any application for an article V convention contained in a properly adopted state legislative resolution is a part of the legislative acts of the state, a
certified copy of which can easily be obtained from the appropriate state official.
83. By the Rules of the United States House of Representatives, members having
petitions to present may do so by delivering them to the Clerk and the petition will
be entered on the Journal and in the Congressional Record. RULES AND l\fANuAL OF
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, H.R. Doc. No. 459, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 441-43 (1961);
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 916 (N. Small &: L. Jayson ed.
1964). Should the failure of a state's members of Congress to do their duty frustrate
the state's application?
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tions relates to the identity of the issues requested to be dealt with
in convention. If, as assumed here, article V contemplates applications for a plenary convention which would propose to the states
its own solution to a particular problem, rather than one to approve
or disapprove the states' solution, such a convention could lawfully
be convened only when there are a sufficient number of proper applications requesting a convention to solve the same problem or
deal with the same issue.84 That is, Congress may not properly call
an article V convention unless a sufficient number of appropriate
and timely applications agree on the problem or general subject
that such a body should consider. Many of the same reasons advanced for the proposition that applications must be reasonably
contemporaneous apply here also. Sufficient national agreement to
warrant the calling of a convention is evidenced only if the legislatures of two-thirds of the states agree that a convention is needed
to deal with the same problem or subject matter. But the state petitions need not otherwise be identical. One commentator noted in
this connection that "Congress would have to determine whether
the language of State applications seeking an amendment on a specific subject should be identical in their texts, or whether applications using varying language but appertaining to the same subject
matter generally would be acceptable. Clearly the latter method is
preferable." 85 However, it is equally clear that disparate state applications seeking a convention to solve different issues or problems
cannot be properly counted together because they do not demonstrate any consensus.
There will always, of course, be some difficulty in characterizing
the scope of the issue, problem, or subject matter for these purposes.
It can be persuasively argued, if one draws the issue or subject matter limitation realistically, that some of the current applications can84. If applications for approval or disapproval of a particular amendment were
proper, only petitions demanding proposal to the states of amendments which were
identical, at least in substance, can be counted together because only they agree on
and ask for the same convention.
85. BRICKFIELD, supra note 66, at 20-21 [citing Corwin &: Ramsey, The Constitutional Law of Constitutional Amendment, 26 NOTRE DAME LAw. 185, 194 (1951)]. It is
sufficient if the specific constitutional changes suggested by each application concern
the same general subject matter; it is not necessary that each application be identical
or propose similar changes in that subject matter. See STAFF OF HousE COMM. ON THE
JUDICIARY, 82D CONG., 2o SESS., PROBLEMS RELATING TO STATE APPLICATIONS FOR A CON·
VENTION To PROPOSE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS OF FEDERAL TAX RATES 15 (Comm.
Print 1952); Corwin &: Ramsey, supra, at 195-96; Note, supra note 69. But see L. ORFIELD, AMENDING THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 42 (1942); Wheeler, Is a Constitutional
Convention Impending?, 21 Iu.. L. REv. 782, 795 (1927).
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not be counted together because they desire convention consideration and solution of different and disparate issues. As Senator Robert Kennedy recently noted:
Twenty-nine of them request a convention to pass an amendment
permitting one house in a bicameral legislature to be malapportioned.
The other three seek only to abrogate the power of the Federal
judiciary to deal with apportionment.
We are told that these two groups of resolutions can be linked
together. But certainly that cannot be. One group wants the judiciary
stripped of jurisdiction and left without power to deal with malapportionment in either chamber of a State legislature. There is no
basis on which Congress can conclude that that group also wants an
amendment which leaves power in the courts and sanctions malapportionment in only one house of a bicameral legislature. Those
legislatures which may have believed it ·wrong for the Federal courts
to enter the "political thicket" at all may not have wanted to guarantee the right of each State to malapportion one branch of its
legislature. A request to shift power from one level to another in
the Federal system is not the same as a request for permission to
deny majority rule in a State legislature.86

In fact, many states which first requested a convention to propose
an amendment excluding the federal courts from reviewing the constitutionality of state legislative apportionment later felt compelled
to issue new calls for a convention to consider an amendment permitting state legislatures to apportion one or both of their houses
on a nonpopulation basis. "It therefore appears that even requesting States themselves do not believe that all the convention calls
which have been made on the reapportionment issue can be 'stacked
up' to reach the required 34." 87
Pushing the identity of subject matter requirement a bit further, Congress may not even be justified in counting together all
of the first group of twenty-nine convention applications referred
to by Senator Kennedy. Some of those request a convention to approve an amendment which would only permit state legislatures,
under certain circumstances, to apportion one of their houses on
a basis other than population; others would permit that and also
permit the state to determine on a completely unfettered basis
"how membership of governing bodies of its subordinate [or local
government] units shall be apportioned.'' 88 Can it be said with any
86. 113 CONG. REc. S.5455 (daily ed. April 19, 1967) (remarks of Senator R. Kennedy).
113 CONG. REc. S.5453 (daily ed. April 19, 1967) (remarks of Senator Tydings).
87. 113 CoNG. REc. S.4232 (daily ed. March 22, 1967) (remarks of Senator Tydings).
See also Ill! CONG. REc. S.5455 (daily ed. April 19, 1967) (remarks of Senator R. Kennedy).
88. See, e.g., applications tendered to the Eighty-ninth Congress by Arizona,
See also

972

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 66:949

complete confidence that an application for a convention to propose an amendment concerning state power over the apportionment
of its state legislature necessarily means that its maker also desires,
or would consent to, a convention to propose an amendment on the
subject of state power over the apportionment of its local government units?
Also, several of those twenty-nine applications call for a convention-proposed amendment to assure unfettered state freedom to
apportion both houses of their legislatures. Most others follow the
Dirksen amendment which would permit this only as to one house. 89
Nevertheless, these two groups might be counted together in determining the number of applications for a plenary convention to solve
a certain problem or issue. They have similar though not identical
objectives and deal with the same problem or subject-the extent
to which the states should have power over their legislatures' apportionment.
G. The Validity of Applications From Malapportioned Legislatures
"Should Congress [automatically] regard as invalid petitions from
malapportioned legislatures calling for a constitutional amendment
to authorize malapportionment?" 00 Senator Tydings, among others,
has opined that "26 of the 32 resolutions were invalidly enacted
[and hence should be ignored] since that many legislatures were malapportioned when they passed these petitions." 91 The argument is
that "[£]or Congress to accept such petitions would be like permitting all Democrats to have two votes in a referendum to determine
whether or not Democrats should have two votes." 92 Elaborating on
this theme, the Senator argues that malapportioned legislatures applying for a constitutional amendment to perpetuate their illegitimate status do not have "clean hands" and, therefore, their petitions
Arkansas, Florida, and Idaho, contained in E. YADLOSKY, STATE PETITIONS AND MEMORIALS
TO CONGRESS ON THE SUBJECT OF .APPORTIONMENT OF STATE LEGISLATURES, LIBRARY OF
CONGRESS LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE SERVICE REPORT JK140C-32/205R (to Aug. 5, 1965).
89. See, e.g., applications tendered to the Eighty-ninth Congress by Alabama, Alaska,
Arizona, and Arkansas contained in YADLOSKY, supra note 88.
90. 113 CoNG. REc. S.5451 (daily ed. April 19, 1967) (remarks of Senator Tydings)
(emphasis added). This is a different question from that considered previously in section I.D., "Timing of the Applications for a Convention." There, one of the issues was
the continued validity of a state application tendered by a malapportioned legislature
in light of that body's subsequent apportionment on a more popular basis.
91. 113 CONG. REc. S.5455. See also 113 CONG. REc. S.5457-58 for a table listing
twenty-six states whose applications were enacted by malapportioned legislatures.
92. 113 CONG. REc. S.4209 (daily ed. March 22, 1967) (remarks of Senator Proxmire).
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for a convention on this subject should be ignored. It may be conceded, he says, that a "malapportioned legislature may be competent,
pending its reapportionment, to pass legislation generally. But such
a legislature has no competence to initiate amendments to the Constitution to make legal its own illegality." 93
Senator Tydings' argument is superficially attractive. The acts
of malapportioned state legislatures are usually considered valid
even if they appear to favor the over-represented interests.94 Any
other result "would produce chaos.'' 95 However, an improperly apportioned legislature may not be considered as equivalent to one
properly apportioned for all purposes. Certain types of action which
are within the capability of a de jure legislature may not be worthy
of respect when engaged in by a body that is only de facto. The
danger of validating certain kinds of acts performed by a malapportioned legislature may outweigh the danger created by the temporary lack of any body capable of acting on the subject. Acts "which
flagrantly violate the citizens' right to equal representation and
which even after reapportionment cannot readily be corrected" 96
may well be in this category. So, in Petuskey v. Rampton91 a federal
district court stated that "well-known general principles of equity require that the ... [unconstitutionally apportioned] Legislature not
consider or vote upon any proposal to amend the Constitution of the
United States on the subject of legislative reapportionment." 98 The
dangers of a contrary rule are apparent. If their actions on this subject were given effect, malapportioned legislatures might be able to
stall reapportioning themselves on the basis of population long enough
to enable them to amend the Constitution and legalize their malapportionment.99
93. 113 CONG. R.Ec. S.5452 (daily ed. April 19, 1967) (remarks of Senator Tydings).
See also 113 CoNG. REc. S.5455 (remarks of Senator R. Kennedy); 113 CONG. R.Ec. S.4232
(daily ed. March 22, 1967) (remarks of Senator Tydings).
94. Ryan v. Tinsley, 316 F.2d 430, 432 (10th Cir. 1963). See also 113 CONG. R.Ec.
S.5451 (daily ed. April 19, 1967) (remarks of Senator Tydings),
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. 243 F. Supp. 365 (D. Utah 1965).
98. Id. at 374.
99. 113 CONG. R.Ec. S.5452 (daily ed. April 19, 1967) (remarks of Senator Tydings).
Of course this is exactly what has happened. The effort to call a constitutional convention is a product of this approach, made manifest in several contexts. Consider, for
example, the following comment by a federal judge:
It is interesting to note the speed by which the last [Utah] State Legislature memorialized Congress • • . to call a constitutional convention to provide for reapportionment "on factors other than population," which resolutions the State Senate
passed on the tenth day of the session, compared to the Legislature's hesitancy to
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In Toombs v. Fortson100 a federal district court enjoined a malapportioned state legislature "from placing on the ballot . . . until
the General Assembly is reapportioned in accordance with constitutional standards, the question whether a constitutional amendment [proposed by the malapportioned legislature and] purporting to amend the present state constitution by substituting an
entirely new constitution therefor shall be adopted.'' 101 The Supreme Court vacated this decree and remanded the case "for reconsideration of the desirability and need for the on-going injunction"
in light of the election of new legislators since entry of the decree
and the stipulation of the parties originally requesting the injunction that the case was now moot on that point. 102 As the dissent
noted, this disposition indicated approval by the Supreme Court
of the lower court's injunction.103
Some Civil War era cases are also relevant here. As a rule, the
official actions of the de facto but not de jure Confederate state
governments were recognized as valid.104 However, efforts of those
governments that were directed toward the perpetuation of the very
things that made them de facto rather than de jure were deemed
void. For example, bonds issued in aid of their prosecution of the
war against the United States were held unenforceable.lOls The
analogies and prior discussion, then, might justify recognition of a
narrow rule invalidating any action of a malapportioned state legislature which would directly perpetuate or allow the continuance of
its unrepresentative condition. If the rule were otherwise, these
bodies would have within their grasp the unfettered authority to
render secure £or all time their presently unconstitutional condition.
This argument is certainly persuasive when applied to a malapportioned state legislature's attempt to ratify a proposed conproperly reapportion under the mandate of this court, which action occurred on
the final (sixtieth) day of the session.
Petuskey v. Rampton, 243 F. Supp. 365, 373 n.10 (D. Utah 1965).
100. 205 F. Supp. 248 (N.D. Ga. 1962), vacated in part and remanded, 379 U.S. 621
(1965).
101. Fortson v. Toombs, 379 U.S. 621, 621-22 (1965), vacating in part and remanding 205 F. Supp. 248 (N.D. Ga. 1962).
102. Id. at 622. It was allegedly moot due to the unclear intentions of the new
legislature.
103. Id. at 627, 637-39.
104. See Baldy v. Hunter, 171 U.S. 388, 393-404 (1898); Johnson v. Atlantic, Gulf
&: West India Transit Co., 156 U.S. 618 (1895); Ketchum v. Buckley, 99 U.S. 188 (1878);
Hom v. Lockhart, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 570 (1873).
105. See Baldy v. Hunter, 171 U.S. 388, 393-402 (1898); Lamar v. Micou, 112 U.S.
452 (1884); Sprott v. United States, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 459 (1874); Hom v. Lockhart, 84
U.S. (17 Wall.) 570 (1873); Thorington v. Smith, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) I (1868).
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stitutional amendment which would legitimate its present condition;106 but it seems unpersuasive as to convention applications.
Indeed, recognition of the latter is less dangerous or injurious to
democratic principle than acceptance of a malapportioned legislature's run-of-the-mill legislation, which is uniformly treated as
binding law. When we treat the usual acts of a malapportioned
state legislature as binding, we permit an illegitimate body to determine, on its own say-so, the rules by which we live and order
our lives, liberty, and property. If we accept petitions from malapportioned state legislatures as valid applications for an article
V convention, we only permit illegitimate power to authorize Congress to initiate or trigger a process which is constituted and operated wholly independently of that illegitimate power. Furthermore,
the actions of that process will directly affect our lives, liberty, or
property only after its product is ratified by three-quarters of the
state legislatures.107
It is, therefore, difficult to see why the act of a malapportioned
legislature in applying for an article V convention on the subject
of state legislative apportionment should be treated any differently
in terms of its lawful effect than the normal run-of-the-mill legislation such a body creates. 108 An application of this sort does not
enable the improperly apportioned body tendering it to preserve
its own power or to control or influence the only process which
can do so.
In this connection, a statement by Justice Harlan about the
initiation of constitutional change on the state level should be
noted:
I can find nothing in the Fourteenth Amendment, elsewhere in the
Constitution, or in any decision of this Court which requires a State
to initiate complete or partial constitutional change only by some
method in which every voice in the voting population is given an
opportunity to express itself. Can there be the slightest constitutional
doubt that a State may lodge the power to initiate constitutional
changes in any select body it pleases, such as a committee of the legislature, a group of constitutional lawyers, or even a "malapportioned"
legislature-particularly one whose composition was considered, prior
106. Only properly apportioned legislatures can ratify such an amendment. Wolf,
An Antireapportionment Amendment: Can It Be Legally Ratified?, 52 A.B.A.J. 326,
327 (1966). The fact that three-fourths of the states must approve is irrelevant since
that is written into the Constitution and must, therefore, be accepted as a basic part
of our social compact.
107. See Forkosch, supra note 77, at 1056-57.
108. U.S. CoNsr. art. V. See also note 106 supra.

Michigan Law Review

976

[Vol. 66:949

to this Court's reapportionment prouncements of June 15, 1964, to
be entirely and solely a matter of state concern?109
Justice Harlan's position seems sound. It may not be unreasonable
to permit a minority of the population to trigger the amendment
process so long as control over the process itself remains with the
majority. Empowering a minority to trigger the process may even be
advantageous in that it assures them democratic consideration of
their grievances.
Toombs v. Fortson 110 is not in conflict with this view. It recognized the vital distinction between according validity to actions of
a malapportioned legislature which are a substantive part of the
amending process and validating those which merely trigger the
process. The court order in Toombs expressly refrained from interfering with the legislature's power to trigger the amending process
by calling a popularly elected and properly apportioned convention which could itself draft a new constitution. 111 That order only
prohibited the malapportioned legislature from submitting to the
people a new constitution that it had drafted.

II. THE

CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION AND ITS PRODUCT

A. Must Congress Call a Convention?
If the requisite number and type of proper article V applications are tendered to Congress within a "reasonable" time of each
other, is Congress under an absolute obligation to call a constitutional convention or can it refuse on the grounds, for example,
that such a body is not really necessary or desirable? Article V
states: "On the Application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the
several States [Congress] shall call a Convention for proposing
Amendments." From this language alone it would seem clear that
Congress was intended to be under a firm and nondiscretionary
obligation to call a convention when sufficient applications from
two-thirds of the states are tendered. The word "shall" as used in
article V is clearly mandatory.
Other evidence also supports this conclusion. The debates in
the Constitutional Convention of 1787 indicate that, in fact, the
109. Fortson v. Toombs, 379 U.S. 621, 626 (1965).
llO. 205 F. Supp. 248 (N.D. Ga. 1962), vacated in part and remanded, 379 U.S. 621
(1965).
Ill. Id. at 258-59.
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primary purpose of the convention method was to afford a means
of proposing amendments when the people were confronted by a
Congress opposed to the change. 112 It is obvious that to permit congressional discretion here would be to defeat this purpose. Hamilton, writing in The Federalist, made the following comment:

By the fifth article of the plan, the Congress will be obliged "on
application of the legislatures of two-thirds of the states ... to call
a convention for proposing amendments. . . ." The words of this
article are peremptory. The Congress "shall call a convention."
Nothing in this particular is left to the discretion of that body.113
Other contemporary evidence is in accord. For example, one delegate to the North Carolina ratifying convention explained the provision of article V under discussion here by noting "that it is very
evident that . . . [the proposal of amendments] did not depend
on the will of Congress; for . . . the legislatures of two-thirds of
the States were authorized to make applications for calling a convention to propose amendments, and, on such application, it is
provided that Congress shall call such convention, so that they will
have no option."114 It therefore seems clear that if Congress receives within a "reasonable" time period, proper applications for
an article V convention to deal with a certain subject from twothirds of the state legislatures, it is absolutely bound to convene
such a body.ms
112. When final debate on article V began in the Constitutional Convention, the
draft being considered provided that "the Congress, whenever two thirds of both
Houses shall deem necessary, or on the applications of two thirds of the Legislatures
of the several States shall propose amendments to this Constitution • • • ." 2 THE
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONSTlTUTION 629 (M. Farrand ed. 1937).
"Col. Mason thought the plan of amending the Constitution exceptionable &: dangerous. As the proposing of amendments is in both the modes to depend, in the first,
immediately, and in the second, ultimately, on Congress, no amendments of the proper
kind would ever be obtained by the people, if the government should become oppressive ••••" Id. at 629. As a result, Mr. Gouverneur Morris and Mr. Gerry moved to
amend the article to require a convention or application of two-thirds of the states.
"Mr. Madison did not see why Congress would not be as much bound to propose
amendments applied for by two thirds of the States as to call a call [sic] a Convention
on the like application.'' Id. at 629-30.
113. THE FEDERALIST No. 85, at 546 (Wright ed. 1961) (Hamilton).
114. IV J. ELLIOT, DEBATES ON THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION
OF THE FEDERAL CONSTlTUTION 178 (2d ed. 1937).
115. See I w. WILLOUGHBY, THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 331
(2d ed. 1929); Forkosch, supra note 77, at 1062-67; Packard, Legal Facets of the Income
Tax Rate Limitation Program, 30 Cm.-KENT L. REv. 128, 133-34 (1952); Sorensen, The
Quiet Campaign To Rewrite the Constitution, SAT. REv., July 15, 1967, at 17-18; Tuller,
A Convention To Amend the Constitution, 193 N. AMER. REv. 369, 375-78 (1911); Note,
supra note 67, at 1067 (1957). Contra, Platz, Article V of the Federal Constitution,
8 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 17, 44 (1934).
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B. Improper Convention Calls, Improper Refusals To Summon
a Convention, and the Judiciary: A Brief Note
At the behest of a proper litigant may the judiciary independently
determine the adequacy, timeliness, and validity of the state petitions
for an article V convention and either (1) enjoin the operation of
such a convention if it has been improperly called and void its
product or (2) force Congress to summon such a body if Congress has
improperly refused to do so? The court's authority to afford the one
remedy seems coextensive with the other since a decision on a single
legal issue is involved in both cases: the sufficiency of the state applications for purposes of an article V convention call. If a court
undertakes to decide that issue at all, it must be prepared to implement its decision by affording the one remedy or the other, as the
case requires.
It has been suggested that the courts can and should decide the
constitutionality of the procedures involved in any effort to amend
our fundamental law so long as such questions are presented in
suits othenvise properly before them. The point is made that "the
Constitution does not expressly or impliedly except the amending
process from the judicial power of the federal courts." 116 Furthermore, if "orderly procedure," legitimated through the process of
judicial review, "is essential in the enactment of ordinary statutes,
should it not be even more so as to the adoption of important and
permanent constitutional amendments?" 117 Substantial Supreme
Court precedent supports this view and indicates that at least some
of the procedural questions which may arise in the amending process can be settled on the merits by the judiciary.118 Failure to com•
116. ORFIELD, supra note 85, at 21 n.51; Quarles, Amendments to the Federal
Constitution, 26 A.B.A.J. 617 (1940).
117. ORFIELD, supra note 85, at 21.
118. See United States v. Sprague, 282 U.S. 716 (1931) (Congress may choose ratification by state legislatures rather than by conventions, even if the amendment should
enlarge federal powers at the expense of "powers reserved to the people" by the tenth
amendment); Leser v. Garnett, 258 U.S. 130 (1922) (the states cannot exclude or restrict
the power of their legislatures to ratify amendments to the federal constitution);
Dillon v. Gloss, 256 U.S. 368 (1921) (Congress, in proposing an amendment to the Constitution, may fix a reasonable time for ratification); National Prohibition Cases, 253
U.S. 350 (1920) (proposal by two-thirds of both houses of Congress requires only the
assent of two-thirds of the members present as long as these constitute a quorum to
do business); Hawke v. Smith, No. 1, 253 U.S. 221 (1920) (the states may not submit
the ratification decision to a popular referendum); Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 3 U.S.
(3 Dall.) 378 (1798) (the President does not participate in the proposal of an amendment). Note that all these decisions on the merits went against the challengers. In
addition, "state courts have frequently and by the great weight of authority held that
they may pass upon the validity of the procedure of amending the state constitutions,
even though there be no express basis therefor." ORFIELD, supra note 85, at 20-21. See
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ply with the constitutional procedures, including those involved in
the convening of any article V convention, may result, then, in a
finding that an amendment was not properly proposed or adopted
and is therefore invalid. 119 Indeed, at the behest of a proper litigant
a court might even enjoin the election of delegates to any improperly
called convention.
Similarly, it has been contended that a congressional failure to
call an article V convention when the prerequisites for summoning
such a body have been met can be upset in the courts. That is, in
a proper suit Congress can be compelled to summon an article V
convention if it is legally bound to do so. The theory is that since
calling the convention is a ministerial act, the courts may force
Congress to do its duty. 120 Recent Supreme Court cases dealing with
state legislative apportionment are said to support this view.121 If
the courts can force state legislatures to follow the Constitution and
properly apportion themselves, they could and would make Congress
perform its duty under article V.
On the other hand, it can be argued with great force that the
central issue in both these situations-the sufficiency of the resolutions for article V purposes-is a nonjusticiable political question, 122
the resolution of which is committed exclusively and finally to Congress. Consequently, the judicial branch may not interfere affirmatively or negatively to implement its own views as to the propriety
of congressional action in calling or refusing to call a convention.123
generally id. at 12-22, for cases holding that the validity of the procedures utilized in
the adoption of a state constitutional amendment is justiciable.
119. The courts will adjudicate on the merits the validity of a constitutional
amendment in light of some alleged procedural defects that may have vitiated its
proper proposal or adoption. See Dillon v. Gloss, 256 U.S. 368 (1921); National Prohibition Cases, 253 U.S. 350 (1920); Hawke v. Smith, No. 1, 253 U.S. 221 (1920); Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 378 (1798). But see Maryland Petition Comm.
v. Johnson, 265 F. Supp. 823 (D. l\:fd. 1967), holding that whether the fourteenth
amendment had been properly proposed and ratified was a nonjusticiable political
question. See also United States v. Gugel, 119 F. Supp. 897 (E.D. Ky. 1954); Heintz v.
Bd. of Educ., 213 Md. 340, 131 A.2d 869 (1957) holding the same way.
120. Cuvillier, Shall We Revise the Constitution?, 77 FORUM 321, 323-25 (1927);
Packard, Constitutional Law: The States and the Amending Process, 45 A.B.A.J. 161
(1959); Packard, Legal Facets of the Income Tax Rate Limitation Program, 30 Cm.KENT L. REv. 128 (1952); Tuller, supra note ll5, at 379-81.
121. 113 CoNG. REc. S.6654-55 (daily ed. May IO, 1967) (remarks of Senator Hruska).
122. See Wheeler, supra note 85, at 791-92; Note, Proposing Amendments to the
United States Constitution by Convention, 70 HARv. L. REv. 1067, 1071 (1957).
123. See also S. 2307, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 5(c), 6(a) (1967) (amended bill); Ervin
appx., 66 MICH. L. REv. 896, 898 (1968). Although the original Ervin bill deferred to
the state legislatures on the validity of the adoption procedure, new § 3(b) provides
that "[q]uestions concerning the State legislative procedure and the validity of the
adoption of a State resolution cognizable under this Act shall be determinable by the
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While there is no case directly on point, the dicta of four justices
of the Court in Coleman v. Miller124 should be recalled: "Undivided
control of [the amending] process has been given by ... Article [V]
exclusively and completely to Congress. The process itself is 'political' in its entirety, from submission until an amendment becomes
part of the Constitution, and is not subject to judicial guidance,
control or interference at any point." 125 A number of more recent
lower court cases are in accord. 126
Persuasive arguments favor the view that questions arising in
the amending process are nonjusticiable. The most important of
these rests upon the notion that in our democracy the practice of
judicial review is not a necessary deduction from the language of
the Constitution. Rather, it is a "practical condition upon its successful operation" which inevitably conflicts with the basic postulate
of majority rule.127 Even viewing judicial review as a desirable
"sober second thought of the community," calculated to perpetuate
our adherence to higher principles,128 does not completely rationalize the process with democratic theory; that reconciliation occurs
only if the people can ultimately put an absolute brake upon the
courts' elaboration of our basic societal principles.129 The most lasting and directly effective way for the people to do this is by amending the Constitution. Consequently, there may be some special sense
in suggesting that the judiciary refrain from interfering as a decision maker in the only process by which the body politic can directly
overturn what it considers to be erroneous judgments of nonelective
courts interpreting the overriding national values upon which our
society rests.
It is one thing for the Court to strike down ... [a particular] Law
as incompatible with its choice of constitutional values, and it is
difficult enough to square this with democratic principle, but it
would seem to be quite a different matter if the Court could, by a
narrow interpretation of the amendment procedures, prevent the
Congress of the United States and its decisions thereon shall be binding on all others,
including State and Federal courts."
124. 307 U.S. 433 (1939).
125. Id. at 459 (1939) (concurring opinion).
126. See, e.g., Maryland Petition Comm. v. Johnson, 265 F. Supp. 823 (D. Md. 1967);
United States v. Gugel, 119 F. Supp. 897 (E.D. Ky. 1954); Heintz v. Board of Educ.,
213 Md. 340, 131 A.2d 869 (1957).
127. L. HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 13-15 (1958). Contra, H. WECHSLER, PRINCIPLES,
PoUTICS AND FUNDAMENTAL LAw 3-15 (1961).
128. A. BICKEL, THE LEAsT DANGEROUS BRANCH 26 (1962) [quoting Stone, The
Common Law in the United States, 50 HAR.v. L. REv. 4, 25 (1936)].
129. Id. at 258.
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ratification of ... [an] amendment which was intended to overrule
. . . [one or more of its decisions respecting the meaning of our
fundamental law.] Of course, the amendment process is itself governed by the Constitution, and it is by no means inconceivable that
an amendment might be unconstitutional. But this seems to be one
instance in which the Court cannot assume responsibility for saying
"what the law is" without, at the same time, undermining the
legitimacy of its power to say so. I do not find it paradoxical to
insist that judicial review in a democracy remains defensible only
to the extent that the Court itself will be defenseless against the
processes through which the community may assert and enforce its
own considered understanding of its basic code.130

For this reason, a judicial effort to enjoin the calling of an article
V convention or to void any proposal it made because the applications upon which that convention was based were inadequate, invalid, or untimely would be at war with the proper role of the
judiciary in our system.
Furthermore, there may be a "textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of [this particular] issue to a coordinate political
department."131 That is, since article V states that Congress is to
call a convention on receipt of the proper number of article V applications, it may intend that Congress be the final judge of their
validity in all respects. This reading of article V is reinforced by the
fact that the organization and make-up of the convention is not
specified in the Constitution, but is instead left to the political discretion of Congress. If Congress was not to be the final judge of the
sufficiency of convention applications, why vest it with such a large
discretion which, as will be noted shortly, would effectively disable
the courts from forcing Congress to do its duty?
By the same token, it can be argued that the validity of state
applications for an article V convention is nonjusticiable because
of "the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution [of the question] without expressing lack of the respect due
coordinate branches of government." 132 It is relevant in this connection to recall that the courts have never issued an injunction or
writ of mandamus directly against the President or Congress because of the doctrine of separation of powers embodied in the Constitution and the consequent obligation of respect owed co-equal
130. Scharpf, Judicial Review and the Political Question: A Functional Analysis,
75 YALE L.J. 517, 589 (1966).
131. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
132. Id.
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branches of the national government by the federal judiciary.133 To
do so here in an effort to bar or force the calling of a convention
would reflect a "lack of respect" for the actions of a coordinate
branch of the federal government in regard to a subject that may
even textually be exclusively committed to its judgment by the
Constitution.134
A further point should be noted with respect to the judiciary's
incapacity in this area. The courts may not force congressional
action as to an article V convention135 because, even reading
prior cases relatively narrowly, certain determinations respecting
the validity of the state applications are most certainly within
the exclusive province of Congress. Coleman v. Miller suggests
at the very least that the timeliness of state applications and
their continued validity in light of attempts to withdraw them are
nonjusticiable political questions.136 Consequently, Congress' decision on these questions will conclusively bind the courts and necessarily disable them from playing any positive role in deciding
whether a convention call is or is not warranted; for determina133. In Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 475 (1867), the Supreme Court
unanimously held that the President himself is not accountable to any court, save the
Senate sitting as a court of impeachment, either for the nonperformance of his constitutional duties or for the exceeding of his constitutional powers. "The Congress is
the legislative branch of the government; the President is the executive department.
Neither can be restrained in its action by the judicial department; though the acts of
both, when performed, are, in proper cases, subject to its cognizance." Id. at 500.
134. C. BRICKFIELD, STAFF OF HOUSE CoMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 85TH CONG., 1ST SESS.,
PROBLEMS RELATING TO A FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 27 (Comm. Print 1957),
states: "It seems more likely, however, that the courts would refuse to issue such a
writ [of mandamus against Congress ordering it to hold a convention] for the same
reasons that they have refused to issue writs on the President of the United States,
namely the doctrine of separation of powers which proscribes action by one branch of
our government against another." See also Powell v. McCormack, 266 F. Supp. 354
(D.D.C. 1967), holding that the separation of powers prevents a federal district court
from entertaining on the merits Adam Clayton Powell's suit charging that the House
improperly excluded him from membership in violation of the Constitution. Of course,
if the Supreme Court reverses that decision, the argument here on the nonjusticiability
of this issue may be weakened.
135. 1 WILLOUGHBY, supra note 117, § 331; Fensterwald, Constitutional Law, the
States and the Amending Process-A Reply, 46 A.B.A.J. 717, 720 (1960). Contra,
Packard, Constitutional Law: The States and the Amending Process, 45 A.B.A.J. 161,
196 (1959).
136. Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939), held that the effectiveness of a state's
ratification of a proposed amendment which it had previously rejected, and the period
of time within which a state could validly ratify a proposed amendment were nonjusticiable political questions within the exclusive and irrevocable determination of
Congress. Of course, as noted earlier, the case can be read much more broadly, and the
dictum justifies the propriety of that latter position. See id. at 457-59 (concurring
opinion). See Dowling, Clarifying the Amending Process, f WASH. &: LEE L. R.Ev. 215
(1940).

March 1968]

Dirksen Amendment: Convention Route

983

tions of the prior questions are prerequisites for any determination
of the latter.
Cases holding that the federal courts can force the states to reapportion their legislatures,137 or that they can force state legislatures to draw congressional districts so that they are as nearly equal
in population as practicable138 are inapposite here. The reason for
this is that "it is the relationship between the judiciary and the
coordinate branches of the Federal Government, and not the federal judiciary's relationship to the States which gives rise to the
'political question.' " 139 That is, "[t]he nonjusticiability of a political question is primarily a function of the separation of powers." 140
Judicial review on the merits of state legislative apportionment or
the drawing of congressional districts by the states only involve federal judicial superintendence of state action or inaction; but judicial review of Congress' action or inaction respecting an article V
convention directly involves the federal courts in a confrontation
with a constitutionally co-equal branch of the federal government.
There is another very practical reason why the legislative reapportionment cases are no authority for judicial intervention to
force a convention call: The scope and nature of the decisions that
courts must make to fashion a remedy, and their practical ability
to implement that remedy, are not at all similar in the two contexts. Courts "are understandably reluctant to give orders which
either will not be enforced or are practically unenforceable"; 141
and, in the same vein they will not attempt to solve problems that
are "in fact soluble only by a legislative solution which a court is
totally incapable of providing." 142 In the legislative apportionment
situation, there is an existing body or model with which a court
can tinker in minor ways to achieve its goal. To implement a reapportionment decree a court need only make those few adjustments and alterations of an existing and functioning institution
which are absolutely necessary to secure districts of equal population. The situation in the present case, however, is quite different.
If Congress refused to act after being ordered to call the convention, what could a court do? Would it call the convention itself?
On what basis would it constitute and implement the selection of
137. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
138. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
139. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210 (1962).
140. Id.
141. E. CAHN, SUPREME COURT AND SUPREME LAW 39 (1954).
142. Id. at 38.
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such a body in light of the fact that the myriad details involved
in the summoning of such a convention are left by the Constitution
to the discretionary political judgment of Congress?143 Any judicial
effort to summon a convention on its own, as a means of curing
Congress' default, would require a court to settle de novo, and
without benefit of any present or past convention under this Constitution to guide it, such questions as the following: What should
be the basis of the convention's apportionment of representation
and voting power? Should the members apportioned to each state
be elected at-large in that state or by districts? What election procedures and machinery will govern the election of convention delegates and who will implement and set up that machinery? How
many convention delegates should there be? What qualifications
must delegates have? When and where should the convention meet?
What procedures, if any, should bind the convention? How are its
expenses to be paid and what shall they be? What staff, if any, shall
the convention have? Even if these questions are answered, it is most
doubtful that a court could ever implement its choices as to the
composition, structure, organization, and financing of a national
constitutional convention. Surely a court could not, for example, appropriate money to finance the convention when the Constitution
expressly vests the appropriation power exclusively in Congress.144
But more basically, a court could not make the choices which it must
in order to call a convention itself on any basis that would be appropriate for judicial, as opposed to legislative, decision-making. 14 G
As noted earlier, the legislative apportionment situation is different because it presents the courts with a more manageable problem. The courts are more easily able to implement any remedy
they devise in such cases since all the rules and machinery respecting the operation, financing, and election of state legislative bodies
143. The Constitution is silent on the organization of the convention. Since Congress is to call it, Congress must of necessity decide its composition. See text accompanying note 153 infra.
144. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9 states: "No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury,
but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law." "[l]t may be observed that court
orders, even if it could be argued that the States had a right to bring legal actions in
the courts against an unwilling Congress to call a convention, would have little
meaning or effect since the courts lack the necessary tools to enforce their decisions
against the Congress." BRICKFIELD, supra note 134, at 28. See also AMERICAN ENTER·
PRISE INSTITUTE, SPECIAL ANALYSIS, A CONVENTION To AMEND THE CONSTITUTION? 47
(1967).
145. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962) (stating that one of the hallmarks of
a political question is the "lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards
for resolving it").
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already exist and will continue to function. Political-legislative-type
questions as numerous or broad-scoped as those discussed above need
not be decided in that context. The court need only modify an ongoing institution with respect to one factor-its districting-in order
to ensure that its decision will be implemented. Judicial acceptance
of the reapportionment cases on their merits does not, therefore,
suggest any similar capacity or ability with respect to suits attempting
to force Congress to call a national constitutional convention.
Consequently, Congress has a duty to call such a convention
upon receipt of the proper number of article V applications and
only on the receipt of the proper number of article V applications.
But that constitutionally-imposed duty is not enforceable in the
courts. The only remedy lies with the people at the polls.
C. The President's Role in an Article V Convention Call

Prior discussion of Hollingsworth v. Virginia 146 suggests that the
President's signature is not required for the valid issuance of an
article V convention call. If this be so, the President's failure to
join in the congressional summons of such a convention would in
no way impair the validity of any amendment the latter body proposed. The language of article V supports this conclusion since it
asserts that "the Congress" is to call a "Convention for proposing
Amendments" on "the Application of the legislatures of two-thirds
of the several states." The Ervin bill likewise specifies that such a
convention be called pursuant to a concurrent resolution which
does not require the President's assent.147
Nevertheless, there is no unanimity on this point, and a contrary argument of substantial weight has been made. 148 The Constitution specifically provides in article I, section 7, that:

[e]very Order, Resolution, or Vote to which the Concurrence of the
Senate and House of Representatives may be necessary ... shall be
presented to the President of the United States, and before the Same
shall take Effect, shall be approved by him, or being disapproved by
him, shall be repassed by two-thirds of the Senate and House of
Representatives, according to the Rules and Limitations prescribed
in the case of a Bill. [Emphasis added.]
146. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 378 (1798). This case held that the eleventh amendment was
valid despite the fact that the President had not signed it after two-thirds of both
Houses of Congress had agreed to submit it to the states. See text accompanying note
28 supra.
147. S. 2307, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. § 6(a) (1967) (amended bill); Ervin appx., 66 MICH.
L. REV. 896, 898 (1968).
148. Black, The Proposed Amendment of Article V: A Threatened Disaster, 72
YALE L.J. 957, 962-64 (1963).
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Hollingsworth v. Virgina recognized an exception to this required
procedure in congressional proposal of constitutional amendments.
But it can be argued that this mode of proposing constitutional
amendments was taken out of the veto process solely because "the
congressional proposal must be by two-thirds in each house, [and]
it [therefore] may have been thought that the requirement for overriding the veto was already met." 149 This ground would not exist
if Congress called a constitutional convention to propose amendments by a simple majority vote. It can therefore be argued that
the commands of article I, section 7, apply to the convention call
since it is an "Order, Resolution, or Vote to which the Concurrence
of the Senate and House of Representatives [are] . . . necessary."
If this is true, the President must sign any call by Congress for a
constitutional convention and if he vetoes it, Congress can override
him only by a two-thirds vote of both Houses.
Additional support for this view can be gleaned from the factto be noted shortly-that Congress must specify how the convention
is to be chosen, its organization, rules, and so forth. This being so,
Congress must necessarily make more than a mere "call" for a convention. Such a call would be meaningless without the inclusion
of the specific terms upon which such a body is to be constituted,
organized, and conducted, and the inclusion of provisions for the
precise means of implementing those terms. Legislation spelling out
these matters would appear similar to the general kinds of legislation
with which Congress normally deals. Consequently, no reason of logic
dictates its different treatment in respect to the need for presidential
approval.
The requirement of presidential concurrence here also seems
logical and desirable on another ground. He is the only official who
is elected by and responsible to the American people as a whole.
His participation in this process that would intimately affect all
Americans and our nation as a whole seems, therefore, especially
proper and natural. The President's duty in such a case would be
the same as that of Congress: To participate in a call only if, in
good conscience, he deems the constitutional requisites for such a
convention to have been properly met. If article V demands presidential concurrence in such a call, the refusal of the chief executive
to act, like that of Congress, would probably be conclusive on the
courts,150 subject, however, to the right of Congress to override his
149. Id. at 965.
150. See text following note 133 supra.
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judgment by a two-thirds vote. Nevertheless, it should be reiterated
that the need for presidential concurrence in any congressional
convention call might well be decided otherwise on the basis of
article V's specific language directing "The Congress" to call a convention and the analogous case of Hollingsworth v. Virginia. 151
D. Congressional Authority Over the Convention:

Some Organizational and Procedural Problems
The language of article V does not expressly indicate the extent
of Congress' authority over the organization, constitution, and procedure of the convention. Indeed, Madison worried about these
questions at the Constitutional Convention of 1789. "He saw no
objection ... against providing for a Convention for the purpose
of proposing amendments, except only that difficulties might arise
as to the form, the quorum, etc." 152 Subject to constitutional limitations, Congress may of course solve these problems. Under its authority to call a convention, Congress has implied power to fix the
time and place of meeting, the number of delegates, the manner
and date of their election, their qualifications, the basis of apportioning delegates, the basis for voting in convention, the vote required in convention to propose an amendment to the states, and
the financing and staffing of the convention. 153 Subsequent discussion will focus on the three most important questions that need to
be resolved in this area: the basis for apportioning delegates and
voting power in such a convention; the means of choosing delegates;
and the vote required for proposing an amendment to the states.
It should be noted first that Congress' determination in the
above matters may be conclusive on the courts for all purposes. 154
A refusal by the courts to review the constitutional merits of the
organizational ground rules imposed by Congress on an article V
convention might be defensible on many of the same bases noted
earlier in connection with the discussion of judicial review and the
application process. Nevertheless, as previously stated, some sound
151. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 378 (1798).
152. 2 Farrand, supra note 114, at 630.
153. See BRICK.FIELD, supra note 134, at 18; L. ORFIELD, AMENDING THE FEDERAL
CoNsrITUTION 43-44 (1942); Black, supra note 148, at 959; Note, supra note 122, at
1075-76. This continuing hand of Congress in the convention process need not appear
unduly strange since article V explicitly gives it the power to decide between modes of
ratification regardless of the mode of proposing the amendment to the states. See also
Note, The Constitutional Convention, Its Nature And Powers-And the Amending Procedure, 1966 UTAH L. REv. 390, 397 n.46.
154. Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939).
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arguments can be made to the contrary. And, even if the courts
are conclusively bound, Congress will still be obligated on this subject to follow the Constitution. However, in that case the only available remedy for congressional abuse of this obligation will be political, resting with the electorate at the polls.
Congress would not be justified in modeling an article V convention on the Constitutional Convention of 1787 where representation and voting were by states.155 Neither the terms of article V
nor any past practice under our Constitution requires representation or voting in such a body to be on that basis. Furthermore, in
1787,
[the states] were in a position of at least nominal sovereignty, and
were considering whether to unite. The result of the Convention
would have bound no dissenting state or its people; the same was
true of the acceptance of the new Constitution by the requisite nine.
All these conditions are now reversed. We are already in an indissoluble union; there is a whole American people. The question in
an amending convention now would be [only] whether innovations,
binding on dissenters, were to be offered for ratification. 156

Consequently, the propriety of apportioning voting power and representation by states in the 1787 Convention cannot settle the propriety of similar action in a convention today. The Ervin bill, in
its original form, ignored this distinction, providing that "[i]n voting on any question before the convention each State shall have one
vote which shall be cast as the majority of the delegates from the
State, present at the time, shall agree.'' 157 The bill, as amended following legislative hearings, more properly provides that each delegate
shall have one vote. And, convention delegations under the bill
will be weighted by population since "[a] convention called under
this Act shall be composed of as many delegates from each State as
it is entitled to Senators and Representatives in Congress." 158
Modeling an article V convention on the Convention of 1787
would also have grave deficiencies from the point of view of popular representation in the amending process. Amendments proposed
by Congress have been approved by two-thirds of the Senate representing thirty-four states, and two-thirds of the House representing
155. M. FARRAND, THE FRAMING OF THE CoNsrITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 57
(1962).
156. Black, supra note 148, at 964-65.
157. S. 2307, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. § 9(a) (1967) (original bill); Ervin appx., 66 MICH.
L. REv. 896, 900 (1968).
158. S. 2307, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. § 7(a) (1967) (amended bill); Ervin appx., 66 MICH.
L. REv. 896, 899 (1968). Members of the House of Representatives must be apportioned
on a population basis. U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 2.
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roughly two-thirds of the nation's population. However, if a contemporary convention were to follow the 1787 model, so that each
state would have one vote regardless of its population, "then thirtyfour states representing 30 per cent of the population could call the
convention, twenty-six states representing one-sixth of the population could propose new amendments, and thirty-eight states representing less than 40 per cent of the population could ratify them." 159
This possibility seems most undesirable. Alterations of our fundamental law should be, within the framework of those procedures
expressly provided in the Constitution for amending it, subjected
to the greatest degree of popular participation and representation
possible. Amendments to our Constitution are, after all, changes of
the basic social compact upon which our whole society rests. Every
member of our society, therefore, has a very large stake in the
amending process which justifies as wide a popular participation
as possible.
In any event, Congress would seem barred from apportioning
delegates and voting power in an article V convention on a basis
which is less representative of the popular will than it is. The reapportionment cases160 tell us that as a general constitutional rule
legislative apportionments must be structured according to the principle of "one man-one vote." Although a convention to propose
constitutional amendments has no authority to ratify them, it is a
vital and essential part of the legislative process. That body should,
therefore, be deemed subject to the usual demand that representation in the statute-making process be based on population.161 Presumably, the due process clause of the fifth amendment binds the
federal government on this subject in the same way as the states
are bound by the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.162 The only exception, of course, is that on the national level
the federal government's obligations in this respect are modified
by the Constitution's express provision for equal representation of
the states in the Senate and all the ramifications attendant to that
particular arrangement.
Due process' insistence that representation in legislative schemes
159. Sorensen, supra note II5, at 19, col. I.
160. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
161. See Toombs v. Fortson, 205 F. Supp. 248 (N.D. Ga. 1962), vacated in part and
remanded, 379 U.S. 621 (1965).
162. Compare Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), with Bolling v. Sharpe,
347 U.S. 497 (1954). See also, e.g., Harrell v. Tobriner, 36 U.S.L.W. 2283-84 (D.D.C.
Nov. II, 1967) (holding that the fifth amendment's due process clause imposes equal
protection requirements on the United States).
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be based solely on population may therefore be subject to an implied
exception which would perm.it Congress to secure symmetry, in apportioning the delegates and voting power of an article V convention, with the alternative body empowered under our fundamental
law to propose constitutional amendments. That is, the delegates
and voting power might properly be· apportioned so that each state
would, as the amended Ervin bill provides, have representation equal
to its combined number of Senators and Representatives in the
Congress. But to be consistent with the demands of due process as
interpreted in the light of the reapportionment cases, delegates and
voting power could never be apport.oned on a less popular basis in
an article V convention than the representation scheme in Congress.
The possible exception to the rule cf "one man-one vote" that may
be applicable in this situation can be only as broad as the particular
scheme of congressional representation written into the Constitution
demands.
Sound reasons suggest, however, that the apportionment of delegates and voting power in a national constitutional convention can
and should be more representative than Congress and be based solely
on population. Values inherent in our federal system are adequately
protected in the ratification process where each state has one vote.
Apportionment of both delegates and voting power solely on the
basis of population makes good sense because it would conduce to the
most accurate expression of the national will, which ought to be the
objective in any such convention. Cc,ngress should, therefore, apportion article V convention delegates to the states solely on the basis
of population and provide that the vote of each delegate be equally
weighted.
In dealing with another important aspect of convention organization the first draft of the Ervin bill provided that "[e]ach delegate shall be elected or appointed in the manner provided by State
law," but this was amended to provide that "two delegates shall be
elected at large and one delegate shall be elected from each Congressional district in the manner provided by State law." 163 This is
a wise change and happy compromise. The delegates from each state
should be elected from districts of equal population, rather than
elected at large within that state or appointed by the state legislature.
Election by districts tends to assure better representation of the numerous discrete and divergent interests found within each state than
election at large. The latter scheme would give all of a state's repre163. S. 2307, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. § 7(a) (1967) (amended bill); Ervin appx., 66
L. REv. 896, 899 (1968).

MICH.
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sentation to the statewide majority interests, completely excluding
minority interests even though they may be majorities in some parts
of the state. If Congress, by deferring to state law, had permitted
some states to elect their delegates to the national convention atlarge, and others to elect theirs from single-member districts of equal
population, it may also have violated due process by analogy to some
of the fourteenth amendment equal protection-reapportionment
cases. 164 Certain classes of electors in states selecting all their delegates
by statewide at-large elections may be much worse off in terms of
convention representation than electors in other states with singlemember delegate districts. 165
Moreover, direct election of convention delegates by either method is more desirable than their appointment by the legislature. Since
the delegates will have to run on a public platform of some sort if
they are to be elected, direct popular selection permits the people
to express their views early in the amending process. In addition,
because the state legislatures were sufficiently disturbed to request
the assemblage of such a body to deal with a certain problem, it
may be wise to insulate the selection of the convention's members
from their influence. The more independent checks in the amending process, and the greater the number of disassociated groups that
consider the problem, the safer and more reliable the result of this
most important process is likely to be. And, since the people-not
their legislatures-are sovereign, and a constitutional amendment is
a modification of the social compact, the convention process should,
as far as possible, be an unfiltered expression of the sovereign will.
A third problem area has to do with the degree of convention
approval to be required to propose an amendment. Although the
initial Ervin draft provided that "a convention called under this
Act may propose amendments to the Constitution by a majority
of the total votes cast on the question," the amended version provides for "a vote of a majority of the total number of delegates to
the convention."166 This is only a minor improvement. Congress
should require a vote of two-thirds of the delegates to propose any
given amendment in order to assure a symmetry of concurrence in
164. See Kruidenier v. McCulloch, 258 Iowa 1121, 142 N.W.2d 355 (1966) (holding
that any scheme of legislative apportionment in which there are multi-member districts and single member districts in the same house is, absent special circumstances,
a violation of the fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause and the state constitution's uniform operation of laws clause). But see Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73
(1966) (holding to the contrary under the fourteenth amendment).
165. See Kruidenier v. McCulloch, 258 Iowa 1121, 142 N.W.2d 355 (1966).
166. S. 2307, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. § IO(a) (1967) (amended bill); Ervin appx., 66 MICH.
L. REv. 896, 900 (1968).
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the bodies empowered to propose constitutional amendmentswhether the body be Congress or a convention. Such symmetry
has a virtue that is greater than token consistency; it would eliminate
any possible forum-shopping. A two-thirds requirement in convention would also guarantee that no amendment, regardless of its means
of proposal, is ever submitted to the states before an overwhelming
consensus as to its desirability is evidenced in a nationally-oriented
body.

E. State and Congressional Authority To Limit the Convention
If an article V convention is properly convened, can either the
states or Congress limit the scope of its authority in any way? It
should be recalled that the applications sponsored by Senator Dirksen and the Council of State Governments attempt to restrict the
convention to the approval or rejection of the precise amendments
contained in those resolutions. Prior discussion has already demonstrated that an article V convention is to be a fully deliberative
body empowered to propose those solutions to a problem that it
deems best. Consequently, the convention cannot be limited by the
state applications to the approval or rejection of the text of any
particular amendments contained therein. Nor, by the same token,
can Congress limit the convention in this manner.167
Some persons have contended, however, that an article V convention would operate free of any control as to subject matter from
outside institutions:
Pandora's Box will be opened wide. For no matter how these
state applications are worded, no matter what limitations are given
by the Congress on its convention call, there is no possible way by
which such a convention can be required to confine itself to reapportionment or any other issue. A national Constitutional Convention, by definition, would represent the highest power in our system.
Like its single predecessor in 1787, which had in its day been specifically told by a cautious Congress to confine itself to the "sole and
express purpose of revising the Articles of Confederation," this new
convention could ignore any instruction, tackle any subject, and
propose any amendments or revisions that it sees fit.168
167. As noted earlier, Brickfield disagrees. BRICKFIELD, supra note 134, at 25. There
is another reason why Congress cannot properly limit a convention to the approval or
rejection of the text of any particular amendment. The framers of the Constitution
probably intended the convention method of proposing amendments to be as free as
possible from congressional interference so that the convention could propose any
amendments it deemed desirable in spite of any congressional objections to the
provision.
168. Sorensen, The Quiet Campaign To Rewrite the Constitution, SAT. RE.v., July

March 1968]

Dirksen Amendment: Convention Route

993

Implicit in this view is the assumption that an article V convention
is a direct and complete expression of the sovereign will; that once
it is assembled, such a body is endowed with all the power residing
in the people. Consequently, neither the states, the Constitution,
nor any agency of the national government can limit it. The delegates to such a convention are, according to this philosophy, "what
the people of the state would be if they were congregated here in
one mass meeting . . . . [They] are the State."169 So, "[w]hen the
people of the United States meet in a constitutional convention
there is no power to limit their action. They are greater than the
Constitution ...." 170
The argument that an article V convention is sovereign and
therefore beyond external control is specious. The convention is
but a constitutional instrumentality of the people, deriving all its
powers from article V. It is no more than a specific means expressly
provided for in the Constitution, and governed by its terms, by
which the people may revise their fundamental law. "While there
may be a special dignity attaching to a convention by reason of its
framing fundamental law, no such dignity or power should attach
which would invest it with a primacy over [the states or] other
branches of government having equally responsible functions [in
the amending process.]" 171 A constitutional convention is, therefore,
distinguishable from an extra-legal or revolutionary convention. A
revolutionary convention is an unconstitutional, hence illegitimate
body exercising provisionally the functions of government and deriving its powers from revolutionary force and violence or from
necessity. Such a convention is possessed of unlimited powers.172 On
the other hand, a constitutional convention is,
as its name implies, constitutional; not simply as having for its
15, 1967, at 18. See also 113 CONG. REc. S.5458 (daily ed. April 19, 1967) (remarks of
Senator Javits) ("A constitutional convention, even if elected under a congressional
mandate that it could deal with only one subject, could run away. After all, it would
be a duly created constitutional convention, and it could propose any amendments
which it decided it wished to propose, subject to ratification.'') 113 CONG. REc. S.5453
(daily ed. April 19, 1967) (remarks of Senator Proxmire) ("And what is to prevent the
representatives of the states in convention assembled from deciding to do just about
anything they please?''); 113 CONG. REc. S.5454 (daily ed. April 19, 1967) (remarks of
Senator Tydings); 113 CONG. REc. S.5462 (daily ed. April 19, 1967) (remarks of Senators
Proxmire and Dirksen). For the state legal precedents to this effect, see Note, The
Constitutional Convention, Its Nature and Powers-And the Amending Procedure,
1966 UTAH L. REV. 390, 402-03.
169. ILLINOIS CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION DEBATES 27 (1847).
170. 46 CoNG. REc. 2769 (1911) (remarks of Senator Heyburn).
171. AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE, supra note 145, at 36.
172. J. JAMESON, THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 6, § 7 (1867).

994

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 66:949

object the framing or amending of Constitutions, but as being within,
rather than without, the pale of the fundamental law; as ancillary
and subservient and not hostile and paramount to it. This species
of Convention sustains an official relation to the state, considered
as a political organization. It is charged with a definite, and not a
discretionary and indeterminate, function. It always acts under a
commission, for a purpose ascertained and limited by law or by
custom. Its principal feature, as contradistinguished from the Revolutionary Convention, is, that in every step and moment of its existence, it is subaltern ....113

Article V contemplates a constitutional convention, not a revolutionary convention. This must be so since the body is summoned
pursuant to the terms and under the authority of that constitutional
provision.
Prior discussion should indicate that while neither the states nor
Congress may limit an article V convention to consideration of the
terms of any particular provision, either or both should be able to
restrict such a body to the proposal of amendments dealing with the
same general subject matter as that contained in the applications.
Indeed, the state applications should accomplish this of their own
force. The reason for this is that an agreement that a convention
ought to be held is required among two-thirds of the state legislatures
before Congress is empowered to convene such a body. No article V
convention may be called in the absence of such a consensus. If the
agreement contemplates a convention dealing only with a certain
subject matter, as opposed to constitutional revision generally, then
the convention must logically be limited to that subject matter. To
permit such a body to propose amendments on any other subject
would be to recognize the convention's right to go beyond that
specific consensus which is an absolute prerequisite for its creation
and legitimate action.
If the state applications, of their own force, can so bind the
convention, then Congress must disregard and refuse to transmit
for ratification any proposed amendment which concerns a different
subject matter. Here, as elsewhere, if the issue is deemed nonjusticiable, the courts will be bound by Congress' decision on the question. This, regardless of whether Congress deems a proposed amendment ineffective because it is beyond the scope of the convention's
authority or effective because it is within the scope of the convention's authority. On the other hand, if this question is justiciable,
173. Id. at 10, § 11.
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the courts may independently determine whether an amendment
proposed by such a convention is beyond the general subject matter requested by the state applications. If such an amendment goes
beyond the permissible subject matter bounds, the courts might
enjoin its ratification or set the amendment aside after ratification
because it was never properly proposed.
The view that the states have this authority to limit a convention to the consideration of amendments dealing with the same general subject matter as that contained in their applications is not
widely accepted. It has been insisted that "[t]he nature of the right
conferred upon the state legislatures in requesting Congress to call
a constitutional convention is nothing more or less than the right
of petition." 174 In this view, the convention itself is a federal instrumentality set up by Congress under powers granted to it by the
Constitution. Since article V directs Congress to call the convention
and is silent as to the details of such a body, Congress is the only
authority entitled to specify those details. Consequently, if any
power can limit such a convention to the proposal of amendments
dealing with the same subject matter as that contained in the state
applications, it can only be Congress. 176 "[S]tate legislatures . . .
have no authority to limit an instrumentality set up under the federal Constitution. . . . [T]he right of the legislatures is confined to
applying for a convention, and any statement of purposes in their
petitions would be irrelevant as to the scope of powers of the convention."176
So, even if the state applications cannot themselves perform
the task, Congress at least should have the power to restrict the
convention to the same general subject matter as that contained in
the applications upon which it is predicated.177 This sort of restriction, in fact, is essential: A convention called pursuant to a resolution
dealing with state legislative apportionment, for example, should
not be permitted to propose amendments concerning the treaty
power or free speech.178 A constitutional change should never be
174. Wheeler, Is a Constitutional Convention Impending?, 21 ILL. L. REv. 782, 795
(1927).
175. STAFF OF HOUSE CoM?.r, ON THE JUDICIARY, 82D CONG., 2D SESS., PROBLEMS RELATING TO STATE .APPLICATIONS FOR A CONVENTION To PROPOSE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITA•
TIONS OF FEDERAL TA.X RATES 15 (Comm. Print 1952).
176. ORFIELD, supra note 153, at 45.
177. Contra, 46 CONG. REc. 2769 (1911) (remarks of Senator Heyburn). ORFIELD,
supra note 153, at 45; Wheeler, supra note 174, at 796; Note, Proposing Amendments
to the United States Constitution by Convention, 70 HARV, L. REv. 1067, 1076 (1957).
178. See STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 82D CONG., 2D SESS., PROBLEMS
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proposed by a convention unless two-thirds of the states have previously agreed that a convention to consider an amendment dealing
with the particular subject matter involved is desirable (or that a
convention is needed to consider a general constitutional revision).
For this reason, it would seem anomalous were Congress powerless
in this regard. Certainly Congress would be under a duty to call a
general convention if two-thirds of the state legislatures properly ask
for one. Equally obvious should be its right and obligation to limit
the scope of a convention to the subject matter requested by the state
applications. As one commentator noted in this regard:
A convention . . . is an instrument of government and acts
properly only when it stays within the orbit of its powers. Since the
Congress is the branch of the Federal Government which has the
duty of calling the convention, and since it acts at the requests of
the States, and since both, in the final analysis, represent the people,
the ultimate source of all power, a Federal constitutional convention,
to act validly, would necessarily have to stay within the designated
limits of the congressional act which called it into being.
. . . This does not mean that the convention may not exercise its
free will on the substantive matters before it; it means simply that
its will shall be exercised within the framework set by the congressional act calling it into being.1 10
At least one state application expressly recognized that such a
body could not validly propose amendments outside of the general
subject matter area specified in the state resolutions and embodied
in the congressional resolution making the convention call. Indiana's
1957 application stated:
It is within their . . . [the states'] sovereign power to prescribe
whether such convention shall be general or shall be limited to the
proposal of a specified amendment or of amendments in a specified
field; that the exercise by the sovereign States of their power to
require the calling of such convention contemplates that the applications of the several States for such convention shall prescribe the
scope thereof ... and that it is the duty of the Congress to call such
convention in conformity therewith; that such convention is without power to transcend, and the delegates to such convention are
RELATING TO STATE .APPLICATIONS FOR A CONVENTION To PROPOSE CONSTITUTIONAL
LIMITATIONS OF FEDERAL TAX RATES 15 (Comm. Print 1952); J. JAMESON, A TREATISE ON
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS; THEIR HISTORY, POWERS AND MODES OF PROCEEDING 10, 11,
493 (4th ed. 1887).

179. BRicKFmLD, supra note 134, at 18. See also w. DODD, THE REVISION AND AMENDMENT OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS 93 (1910) (A convention "is bound by all restrictions
either expressly or impliedly placed upon its actions by the constitution in force at
the time.").
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"Without power to act except "Within, the limitations and provisions
so prescribed. 180
With the exception of the statement regarding the states' right to
limit such a convention "to the proposal of a specified amendment,"
the thesis of the Indiana resolution is identical to that suggested
here.
There is at least some judicial authority, by analogy, for the
proposition that Congress may limit the scope of an article V convention's deliberations. State courts have on several occasions held that
state constitutional conventions are subject to the restrictions contained in the call for the convention. The theory is that the convention call promulgated by the legislature is a law and the delegates are
elected under the terms of that law.181 Consequently, they can exercise no powers beyond those conferred by such a statute or the state
constitution.
It seems clear, therefore, that Congress at least can limit the
scope of any article V convention to the "subject matter" or "problem" at which the state applications were directed. Certainly Congress is morally bound to do so. In any subsequent litigation, the
courts should respect such a limitation imposed by Congress and disregard any provisions proposed by a convention beyond its authority.
Of course, the notion that the state applications can themselves limit
the scope of a convention's authority should not be ignored. If that
theory is rejected, however, the people of the United States will have
to rely on Congress.
The Ervin bill expressly adopts this approach and seems to be
completely sound in this respect. It specifically provides that every
delegate to an article V convention must, before taking his seat,
"subscribe an oath not to attempt to change or alter any section,
180. C. BRICKFIELD, supra note 134, at 25.
181. See Wells v. Bain, 75 Pa. 39, 51 (1874); Staples v. Gilmer, 183 Va. 613, 33
S.E.2d 49 (1945). In the latter case the court stated at 627, 33 S.E.2d at 55:
'Where the legislature, in the performance of its representative function, asks the
electors if they desire a convention to amend or revise a certain part of the Constitution but not the whole Constitution, an affirmative vote of the people on
such question would have the binding effect of the people themselves limiting
the scope of the convention to the very portion of the Constitution suggested
to them by the legislature. The wishes of the people are supreme. Some agency
must ascertain the desire of the people, and the legislature, by section 197, has
been selected by them to do so.
See also Cummings v. Beeler, 189 Tenn. 151, 223 S.W.2d 913 (1949); Note, The Constitutional Convention, Its Nature and Powers-And the Amending Procedure, 1966
UTAH L. R.Ev. 390, 403-05. But see Goodrich v. Moore, 2 Minn. 49, 53 (1858) (dictum).
For debate on both sides of this question, see I DEBATES OF THE CONVENTION To AMEND
THE CoNSTITUTION OF PENNSYLVANIA 1872-73, 52-61 (1873).

998

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 66:949

clause or article of the Constitution or propose additions thereto
except in conformity with the concurrent resolution [of Congress]
calling the convention." 182 In addition, it provides that "[n]o convention called under this Act may propose any amendment or
amendments of a general nature different from that stated in the
concurrent resolution [of Congress] calling the convention." 183 In
summoning the convention, Congress is to "set forth the nature of
the amendment or amendments for the consideration of which the
convention was called."184 Furthermore, the product of the convention's work may be disapproved by Congress for submission to the
states for ratification "on the ground that its general nature is different from that stated in the concurrent resolution calling the
convention." 185
In the end, it seems clear that an article V convention may be
limited to the same general subject matter as that contained in the
state applications. A runaway convention is no real danger since the
power of the states and Congress in this regard is based on a sound
legal and practical basis. "[T]ogether, the Congress and the State
legislatures ... not only initiate but also finally approve the work
of any convention. With this ultimate power at their commend
[sic], they may fence off the boundaries of power within which a
convention must operate."186

F. Ratification of Convention-Proposed Amendments
Even if an amendment on the subject of state legislative apportionment could be validly proposed by a convention called pursuant
to the resolutions in question here, Congress would not be bound by
the resolutions' stipulation that such a proposal be ratified by the
legislatures of three-fourths of the states. Article V clearly empowers
Congress to determine in its sole discretion which of the two modes
of ratification specified in that provision shall be utilized; 187 this,
regardless of the method of the particular amendment's proposal.
Congress could, then, select either mode-"by the Legislatures of
182. S. 2307, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. § 8(a) (1967) (amended bill); Ervin appx., 66 MICH.

L. REv. 896, 899 (1968).
183. Id. § lO(b).
184. Id. § 6(a).
185. Id. § ll(b).
186. C. BRICKFIELD, STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 85TH CONG., }ST SESs.,
PROBLEMS RELATING TO A FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 26 (Comm. Print 1957).
187. United States v. Sprague, 282 U.S. 716 (1931). See Forkosch, The Alternative
Amending Clause in Article V: Reflections and Suggestions, 51 MINN. L. REV. 1053,
1078-80 (1967).
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three-fourths of the several states, or by Conventions in three-fourths
thereof ..."-and that selection would be immune from alteration
by judicial review.
The initial Ervin bill recognized this, providing that Congress
specify in its convention call "the manner in which such amendment
or amendments [proposed by the convention] shall be ratified in
accordance with article V of the Constitution."188 This approach,
which seems desirable, was inexplicably deleted in the amended version. If Congress does not provide for the ratification mode in the
convention call, it might be tempted to refuse to provide for ratification if it disliked the proposal's terms. This would be improper since
the convention means of proposing amendments was intended to be
independent of Congress. Indeed, it was meant to provide a route
by which amendments could be proposed to the Constitution when
the national legislature refused to act. "Therefore, the best time
and place to make such a choice [respecting the means by which any
convention proposal shall be ratified] is in the call, and thereafter
any further congressional function should be extremely and strictly
limited to simple procedural duties." 189
One last point should be noted with respect to the ratification of a
proposed amendment dealing with state legislative apportionment.
Prior discussion would support the conclusion that malapportioned
state legislatures may not properly or validly ratify a constitutional
amendment legitimizing legislative malapportionment. 190 As noted
previously, this conclusion is justified by analogy to the doctrine of
"clean hands." It is also supportable because the reasons of expediency which normally justify recognition of a malapportioned
legislature's acts are outweighed where recognition of its action
would cause irreparable and permanent injury to those protected by
the present constitutional requirement of one man-one vote.

III.

CONCLUSION

The convention route to proposing constitutional amendments
is uncharted. Many difficult questions would have to be resolved in
any effort to utilize it. Current pressures for such a convention may
188. S. 2307, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. § 6(a) (1967) (original bill); Ervin appx., 66 MICH.
L. REv. 896, 898 (1968).
189. Forkosch, supra note 187, at 1079. The Ervin Bill, however, imposes the duty
on Congress to stop the proposal's submission to the states if it is outside of the general
subject matter submitted to the convention for its consideration. S. 2307, 90th Cong.,
1st Sess. § ll(b) (1967) (amended bill). As noted earlier, this seems proper.
190. See text accompanying notes 90-107 supra. See also Wolf, An Antireapportionment Amendment: Can It Be Legally Ratified?, 52 A.B.A.J. 326 (1966).
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induce the settlement of some of these questions but are unlikely to
resolve them all. The Ervin approach, which is for Congress to enact
a general statute on this subject, seems desirable. However, the bill's
provisions should be modified in conformance with the suggestions
made here.
In any event, the efforts of the thirty-two states that have tendered
petitions to Congress since 1962 for an article V convention seem to
be constitutionally inadequate. Congress may call such a body only
upon receipt of proper, valid, and timely applications from twothirds of the states. The petitions from these states are inadequate
for present purposes because they do not request the plenary kind
of convention which article V contemplates and cannot properly be
treated as applications for this kind of convention; most of these
applications are now stale; and, anyway, all thirty-two could not be
added together as one group because they do not deal with the same
subject matter. Even if two more states tender applications for a
convention Congress should, therefore, refuse to call such a body on
the basis of these state petitions. It seems probable that Congress'
decisions on this matter will be given conclusive effect by the
courts-either by avoidance as a nonjusticiable "political question,"
or on the constitutional grounds ventured herein.

